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THE JOURNEY FROM ExParte CrowDogTO
Littlechief: A SURVEY OF TRIBAL CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN WESTERN
OKLAHOMA
F. Browning Pipestem*
Under the provisions of Public Law 83-280 it appears
therefore that the State of Oklahoma could have unilaterally
assumed jurisdiction over any "Indian country" within its
borders at any time between i953 and 1968 had the
Oklahoma Constitution been amended as required. After the
enactment of Title IV in 1968 Oklahoma had to amend its
constitution and the affected tribes had to consent to the
State's assumption of jurisdiction over them before the State
could acquire jurisdiction over "Indian country."
-Honorable Fred Daugherty, United States
of America v. Brock Kenyon Little Chief,
No. CR-76-207-D, Nov. 7, 1977
Thereafter, a motion to dismiss said information was filed
and a hearing held thereon on August 10, 1976, at the conclu-
sion of which the court sustained the motion to dismiss, find-
ing as he did so that the lands upon which the homicide oc-
curred were within lands defined as Indian Land, and that the
State of Oklahoma was without jurisdiction to prosecute the
defendant. Thereafter, the State of Oklahoma filed an appeal
with this Court ....
We find that the issue sought to be raised has been deter-
mined by the Honorable Fred Daugherty, and that said deter-
mination is binding on the State of Oklahoma since it in-
volves the construction and application of Federal Stat-
utes ....
- State v. Littlechief, No. 0-77-107,
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals,
Jan. 4, 1978
*B.A., Northwestern Oklahoma State College; J.D., University of Oklahoma. The
author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of G. William Rice, third-year law student,
University of Oklahoma College of Law, as research assistant on this article.
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Introduction
In accordance with the provisions of Section 14 of the Indian Ap-
propriation Act of 1889,' Lucius Fairchild, J.R. Hartranft, and
A.H. Wilson were appointed by the President as a commission to
"negotiate with the Cherokee Indians, and with all other Indians
owning or claiming lands lying west of the ninety-sixth degree of
longitude in the Indian Territory, for the cession to the United
States of all their title, claim, or interest of every kind or character
in and. to said lands." This commission's primary purpose was to
secure title to the area known as the Cherokee Outlet and secon-
darily to negotiate with other Indian tribes. Thus, the commission
was referred to generally as the Cherokee Commission. Later,
with the addition of Mr. Jerome, this commission would be
known more familiarly to the western Oklahoma Indian tribes as
the Jerome Commission.
Beginning in 1890, the Jerome Commission, through a series of
"allotment agreements" consummated with the Indian tribes in
western Oklahoma, except for the Kaw, Otoe-Missouria, and
Ponca Tribes, secured for the United States the cession of vast
acreages of land within the original boundaries of tribal reserva-
tions, subject to allotments of land to individual members of the
affected tribes in addition to reservations of specific tracts of land
for tribal or federal uses.
The judicial and administrative treatment of the legal aftermath
of this allotment and cession policy executed by the Jerome Com-
mission and the major federal enactments such as the Dawes Act
(General Allotment Act of 887); the Oklahoma Organic Act of
May 2, 1890, creating the Oklahoma Territory; the Burke Act of
May 8, 1906, amending the General Allotment Act; the Oklahoma
Enabling Act of June 16, 1906; the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934; the Oklahoma Indian Welfate Act of 1936; Section 1151 of
Title 18 of the United States Code, defining Indian country; Public
Law 230, relating to assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction
over Indian country by the states; and the Indian Civil Rights Act
of 1968, as they bear upon the issue of tribal civil and criminal
jurisdiction in western Oklahoma, is the subject of this article.
As was stated in McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission,' it
may be helpful to begin this discussion of the law applicable to this
complex area with a brief statement of what this survey of tribaljurisdiction in western Oklahoma does not involve. Justice Mar-
1. 25 Stat. 1005 (1889).
2. 41.1 U.S. 164 (1973).
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shall, speaking for the Court, declared: "We are not here dealing
with Indians who have left or never inhabited reservations set
aside for their exclusive use or who do not possess the usual ac-
coutrements of tribal self-government."
All of the Indian tribes in western Oklahoma possess the usual
accoutrements of tribal self-government consistent with the Indian
sovereignty principles enunciated in Worcester v. Georgia.3 No
federal law has abolished any of the ordinary attributes of
sovereignty of the above referenced federally recognized Indian
tribes. As long as the Indian tribes in western Oklahoma maintain
tribal relations (federal recognition), the Indian customs and laws
control the internal affairs of the various tribes until Congress ex-
pressly directs otherwise. Section 12 of the Oklahoma Organic
Act4 expressly recognizes these tribal powers.
The 1890 date is critical in that from 1890 forward several dif-
ferent statutory schemes for the different tribal groups in
Oklahoma become evident. Consideration of the comprehensive
statutory treatment of these tribes is not material here except to
point out that a separate and special statutory arrangement
emerges for those other tribes which occupied the Indian Territory
and the tribes we will refer to as the Indian tribes in western
Oklahoma.
In discussing the legal status of the various Indian tribes in
Oklahoma, the Handbook of Federal Indian Law, in the 1958
revised edition at pp. 985-86, describes the situation in the follow-
ing manner:
It must be recognized that in many respects the statutes
and legal principles discussed in other chapters of this work
as generally applicable to Indians of the United States, also
apply to Oklahoma Indians, while in other respects
Oklahoma Indians, or certain groups thereof, are excluded
from the scope of such statutes and legal principles.
And, further, at pp. 986-87, the treatise points out the counter-
productive impreciseness in referring to the many Indian tribes in
Oklahoma as the "Oklahoma tribes," by stating:
Reference is sometimes made to the Five Civilized Tribes
(the Cherokees, Choctaws, Chickasaws, Creeks and
Seminoles), and the Osages, as if they were the only tribes
resident in the State of Oklahoma. In fact, the Indian tribes
residing in the State include also the Cheyenne, Arapaho,
3. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
4. Act of May 2, 1890 (26 Stat. 81).
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Apache, Comanche, Kiowa, Caddo, Delaware, Wichita,
Kaw, Otoe, Tonkawa, Pawnee, Peoria, Ponca, Shawnee,
Ottawa, Quapaw, Seneca, Wyandotte, Iowa, Sac and Fox,
Kickapoo, Pottawatomi and others.
Many general statutes are expressly made inapplicable to
the Five Civilized Tribes or the Osages or to these nations
and the Osages or to all tribes in Oklahoma. Congress has
passed many special laws for Oklahoma tribes, especially for
the Five Civilized Tribes and the Osages.
The recognition the more well-known Oklahoma tribes have
received and their legal status has served to obscure the substan-
tive legal distinctions between those tribes and the tribes occupy-
ing the western part of the state of Oklahoma. Whereas, the Five
Civilized Tribes and Osages have generally been the subject of
special congressional treatment, the Indians in western
Oklahoma, with the single exception of the exclusion from certain
portions of the 1934 Wheeler-Howard Act commonly referred to
as the Indian Reorganization Act, have been included in the
general drift of federal legislation affecting Indians nationwide.
The misplaced reliance on the impreciseness of the term
"Oklahoma Indians" and the distinction between various tribal
groups in Oklahoma is illustrated in the following quotation from
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. United States:
The underlying principles on which these decisions are based
do not fit the situation of the Oklahoma Indians. Although
there are remnants of the form of tribal sovereignty, these In-
dians have no effective tribal autonomy as in Worcester v.
Georgia, and, unlike the Indians involved in The Kansas In-
dians case, they are actually citizens of the State with little to
distinguish them from all other citizens except for their
limited property restrictions and their tax exemptions. Their
lands are held in fee, not in trust, as in the Rickert case, and
the doctrine of constitutional immunity from taxation for the
income of their holdings on the federal instrumentality
theory has been renounced .... [Citations omitted.]'
The questions in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. United States
involved the validity of the state inheritance tax on the estates of
three members of the Five Civilized Tribes. The term "Oklahoma
Indians" has no vaiidity in law; there is no "Oklahoma Indians"
tribe. Additionally, the foundation decision relating to tribal
5. 319 U.S. 598, 603 (1942).
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sovereignty is Worcester v. Georgia construing the powers of the
Cherokee Nation, one of the Five Civilized Tribes mentioned by
Justice Black. One of the tribes then constituting The Kansas In-
dians is the present Absentee Shawnee Tribe, and the Rickert case
involves the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe in South Dakota, a
tribe whose legal status bears relevance to the tribes in western
Oklahoma.
The April 1976 United Indian Tribes of Western Oklahoma and
Kansas Position Paper commented on this subject in the following
manner:
The impurity of definition regarding the legal character of
American Indian tribal governments in Western Oklahoma
and the prevailing federal policy denying our tribal entities a
just measure of tribal sovereignty have created a state of
relative legal chaos that in general frustrates the development
of effective self-government and categorically disenfranchises
our tribal governments from eligibility for a number of ex-
tremely beneficial federal programs.
The confusion about tribal legal status and the deleterious effect
of this confusion on tribal jurisdiction is amply illustrated in the
following quotation from a 1953 letter by Johnston Murray,
Governor of Oklahoma, replying to a suggestion from Assistant
Secretary of the Interior Orme Lewis that the state of Oklahoma
meet with its Indian tribes in reference to Oklahoma assuming
civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian country in the state.
Governor Murray stated:
When Oklahoma became a State, all tribal governments
within its boundaries became merged in the State and the
tribal codes under which the tribes were governed prior to
statehood were abandoned and all Indian tribes, with respect
to criminal offense and civil causes, came under State
jurisdiction.
Therefore, Public Law No. 280 will not in any way affect
the Indian citizens of this State.
In contrast, an August 17, 1942, letter from the Department of
the Interior to the Attorney General of the United States regarding
jurisdiction in the Oklahoma Territory concluded as follows:
In that part of the State which was Oklahoma Territory a
restricted Indian allotment continues to have the character of
Indian country in the same manner as restricted allotments
and reservations elsewhere in the country, with the possible
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exception of crimes committed by Indians against non-
merriber Indians, *which crimes are apparently within the
jurisdiction of the State courts as a result of the 1890 statute.
On these allotments both section 217 of title 25 and section
548 of title 18 apply. Crimes between Indians of the same
tribe which are not covered by section 548 remain subject to
tribal jurisdiction.
The presentation of these legal conclusions should be ac-
companied by some statement of the practical situation.
None of the tribes in Oklahoma has exercised criminal
jurisdiction in recent years and none has a court of Indian of-
fenses established either by the tribe or under the regulations
of this Department. It is therefore important that some
definite criminal procedure be established for crimes not em-
braced by Federal or State law ....
It is significant to note that in spite of the conclusion supporting
tribal jurisdiction, no affirmative steps were taken to implement
the tribal authority. These radically different conclusions repre-
sent both the complexity and obscurity of matters involving the
allocation of jurisdiction over Indian country in that part of
Oklahoma that was Oklahoma Territory between federal, state
and tribal authorities. In general, the state has assumed that no
tribal jurisdiction exists; the federal authorities vascillate; and the
Indian tribes are caught between the denial and the vascillation in
a reactionary posture without the means to take the initiative.
The complexity and confusion submerging tribal jurisdiction in
Oklahoma has led to several erroneous assumptions about tribal
rights:
1. That, by agreeing to the allotment of their reservations, the
tribes also gave up heretofore legally recognized tribal sovereign-
ty.
2. That, by accepting individual allotments, tribal members no
longer retained their federal trust status and became assimilated
into the general community and thereby under the jurisdiction of
Oklahoma.
3. That Indian country jurisdiction was confined to Indian
reservations and, therefore, jurisdiction over Indian allotments
and tribal land fell exclusively to the state authorities.
Because tribal and federal jurisdiction is exercised within the
limits of Indian country as categorically defined in Section 1151 of
Title 18 of the United States Code, the existence, diminishment, or
disestablishment of the reservation boundaries bears a direct rela-
tionship to the territorial extent of Indian country in western
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Oklahoma. In terms of the existence or nonexistence of reserva-
tion status, only the boundaries of the Ponca and Otoe-Missouria
Indian reservations have been expressly mentioned and
disestablished by federal statute. In pre-1962 decisions, the boun-
daries of three other reservations-the Kickapoo, the Kiowa,
Comanche and Apache, and the Cheyenne-Arapaho-have been
judicially determined to be disestablished. The 1962 date is impor-
tant because in that year the United States Supreme Court enun-
ciated new analytical standards for determining whether reserva-
tion boundaries have been extinguished different from those ap-
plied in the pre-1962 decisions affecting Indian reservations in
Oklahoma. As a result of these decisions, a de facto ad-
ministrative denial of reservation status for the balance of tribes in
western Oklahoma has occurred. One of the pre-1962 decisions is
presently being challenged in the federal courts by the Cheyenne
and Arapaho tribes in Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes v. State.6
At least two tribes, the Iowa and the Sac and Fox, on the face of
their allotment agreements and applying the post-1962 standards
for finding disestablishment, have an apparent case clear enough
to justify an administrative finding that their reservations were
diminished rather than totally disestablished. As to the status of
the original reservation boundaries, these two tribes in all
likelihood stand on the same footing with the other tribes.
At least one other group of tribes, the Kiowa, Comanche and
Apache, have a two-tiered inquiry into their reservation status.
There is one inquiry to determine if the pre-1962 Tooisgah deci-
sion is correct in light of the post-1962 Supreme Court standards,
and another inquiry into the status of the 480,000-acre area re-
served for tribal pasture purposes out of the cession considered in
Tooisgah.
It is clear that the complexity of issues involved in the ultimate
resolution of the reservation boundary questions will require
litigation such as that initiated by the Cheyenne -Arapaho tribes.
Pending clarification of the reservation boundary issues in the
Cheyenne-Arapaho case and assuming, for argument purposes
only, that the original reservation boundaries of the various In-
dian reservations have been disestablished, the pertinent questions
become:
6. No. CIV-75-0769-D (W.D. Okla. 1978) A final decision in this case will clarify the
jurisdictional status of the Cheyenne and Arapaho Reservation, and provide substantive
standards for other tribes similarly situated. The district court held that the Cheyenne and
Arapaho Reservation had been disestablished and the case is now on appeal to the Tenth
Circuit.
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-Has the Congress by any legislative enactment expressly ex-
tinguished tribal civil and criminal jurisdictional powers in
western Oklahoma?
-Does Indian country exist for federal and tribal jurisdictional
purposes in western Oklahoma?
-Has the Congress granted the state of Oklahoma civil and
criminal jurisdiction over Indian country in western Oklahoma?
A Statutory Review: 1890-1968
The judicial and administrative treatment of the legal aftermath
of the allotment and cession policy executed by the Jerome Com-
mission, and the major federal enactments, such as the Dawes
Act,7 the Oklahoma Organic Acts creating the Oklahoma Ter-
ritory, the Burke Act9 amending the General Allotment Act, the
Oklahoma Enabling Act,"0 the Indian Reorganization Act," the
Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act," Section 1151 of Title 18 of the
United States Code defining Indian country, Public Law 280"
relating to assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction over In-
dian country by states, and the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,"
as they bear upon the issue of tribal authority to enact and enforce
civil and criminal codes in western Oklahoma, is the subject of
consideration in this section of the article.
Perhaps the most basic principle of all Indian law, supported by
a host of decisions, is the principle that those powers which are
lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated
powers granted by express acts of Congress, but rather inherent
powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extin-
guished.s This principle, derived from the recognition of Indian
tribes as "distinct, independent, political communities,"'" has
resulted in a judicial doctrine recognizing that treaties and statutes
of Congress are to be examined for express recognition or limita-
tion of those powers.
7. General Allotment Act of Feb. 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388.
8. Oklahoma Organic Act of May 2, 1890, 26 Stat. 81.
9. Act of May 8, 1906, 34 Stat. 182.
10. Act of June 16, 1906, 34 Stat. 267.
11. Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 984.
12. Act of June 26, 1936, 49 Stat. 1967.
13. Pub. L. No. 83-280, Act of Aug. 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 589, as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§
1151, 1162 (1970).
14. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 77, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1970).
15. F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (U.S.G.P.O. 1942), reprinted(1971) [hereinafter
cited as COHEN]. The United States Supreme Court described Cohen as "an acknowledged
expert in Indian law." Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1956).
16. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 519 (1832).
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An illustration of these points is contained in the Act of June 28,
1898,17 popularly referred to as the Curtis Act, wherein the Con-
gress sets forth the manner in which tribal powers are expressly
limited. Section 28 of that Act, speaking to the tribal authority of
those tribes within the Indian Territory to establish and maintain
tribal courts, provides:
That on the first day of July, eighteen hundred and ninety-
eight, all tribal courts in Indian Territory shall be abolished,
and no officer of said courts shall thereafter have any
authority whatever to do or perform any act theretofore
authorized by any law in connection with said courts, or to
receive any pay for same; and all civil and criminal causes
then pending in any such shall be transferred to the United
States court in said Territory by filing with the clerk of the
court the original papers in the suit.
In a previous section, Section 26, the Congress rendered the
tribal laws unenforceable in the United States courts, stating that
"on or after the passage of this Act the laws of the various tribes or
nations of Indians shall not be enforced at law or in equity by the
courts of the United States in the Indian Territory." Another
substantive inherent tribal power-the power to tax-was
abolished for all of the major Indian Territory tribes in the Act of
April 26, 1906.8
No like legislative limitations were enacted for the Indian tribes
in Oklahoma Territory, leading to the conclusion that Congress
did not intend to accomplish a similar diminution of tribal powers
in the Oklahoma Territory.
A detailed examination of the allotment statutes and allotment
agreements ratified by Congress relating to the western Oklahoma
tribes (Absentee Shawnee and Citizen Band Potawatomi,"
Cheyenne and Arapaho, 2 Iowa," Kansas or Kaw,2 Kickapoo,'
Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache," Otoe and Missouria, Ponca, 6
17. 30 Stat. 495 (1898).
18. 34 Stat. 137 (1906).
19. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, 25 Stat. 1016, 1019.
20. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 989.
21. Act of Feb. 18, 1891, 26 Stat. 753.
22. Act of July 1, 1902, 32 Stat. 636.
23. Act of Mar. 3, 1893, 27 Stat. 557.
24. Act of June 6, 1900, 31 Stat. 676.
25. General Allotment Act of Feb. 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388.
26. Id.; Act of Apr. 21, 1904, 33 Stat. 217.
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Sac and Fox,' Tonkawa,' Wichita and Affiliated Bands, 9) reveals
no express provision for the termination of legislative authority
exercised by tribal legislative bodies, generally known as tribal
councils, and cannot be construed as limitations on tribal govern-
ments.3" This view of the basis of tribal authority is only an ap-
plication of the general principle that "it is only by positive enact-
ments, even in the case of conquered and subdued nations, that
their laws are changed by the conqueror."31
It is clear from the Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte Crow
Dog" that prior to 1885 Indian tribal jurisdiction, whether they
exercised their jurisdictional powers through written codes and
constitutions or by tradition, was plenary. In Crow Dog, the
court held that the murder of Spotted Tail, a Sioux Indian, within
Indian country, by Crow Dog, another Sioux Indian, was an of-
fense exclusively within the jurisdiction of the tribe to the exclu-
sion of the territorial or federal courts. It would follow from this
decision that this offense and all lesser offenses committed within
Indian country by Indians under the sovereignty of a particular In-
dian tribe would similarly be exclusively vested in that tribe.
There are no apparent reasons that this holding should not apply
to all of the Indian tribes in western Oklahoma.
The aftermath of Crow Dog presents the first major limitation
on tribal jurisdictional powers. Spotted Tail was a famous Sioux
chief and the hue and cry that arose when it was determined that
traditional Sioux law, even on murder, was remedial rather than
punitive resulted in the Congress passing the Major Crimes Act,3
taking seven major crimes out of the tribal jurisdiction and ex-
clusively vesting the federal courts with criminal jurisdiction over
these crimes. The list of crimes was later expanded to ten and now
includes fourteen offenses, which in general are the major felonies.
The Major Crimes Act is presently codified in Sections 1153 and
3242 of Title 18 of the United States Code.
Indian tribes, then, remained vested with exclusive jurisdiction
over the offenses which were not specifically vested in the federal
courts by Congress. In other words, what was not taken by Con-
gress remained in the tribes. The states occupied no meaningful
position in this jurisdictional arrangement.
27. Agreement of Feb. 13, 1891, 26 Stat. 749.
28. Act of Mar. 3, 1893, 27 Stat. 643.
29. Act of Mar. 2, 1895, 28 Stat. 895.
30. Solicitor's Opinion, M-36783 (1969).
31. Wall v. Williamson, 8 Ala. 48, 51 (1845).
32. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
33. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 385.
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Cohen has expressed the status of tribal authority as follows:
The whole course of judicial decision on the nature of In-
dian tribal powers is marked by adherence to three fun-
damental principles: 1) An Indian tribe possesses, in the first
instance, all the powers of any sovereign state. 2) Conquest
renders the tribe subject to the legislative power of the United
States and, in substance, terminates the external powers of
sovereignty of the tribe (except those recognized by Congress
such as the power to make war, or to treat with the United
States), e.g. its power to enter into treaties with foreign na-
tions, but does not by itself affect the internal sovereignty of
the tribe, i.e. its powers of local self-government. 3) These
powers are subject to qualification by treaties and by express
legislation of Congress. But, save as thus expressly qualified,
full powers of internal sovereignty are vested in the Indian
tribes and in their duly constituted organs of government.34
It follows, then, that once a tribe has entered into a treaty rela-
tionship with the United States, the Indian tribe is recognized by
United States law as a governmental unit possessed of all internal
powers not expressly qualified by Congress." By the year 1890,
the tribes occupying what was to become Oklahoma Territory
were possessed of fundamental powers of self-government with
their control over internal affairs limited only by the provisions of
the Major Crimes Act. Included among those powers of internal
sovereignty is the power to establish legislatures, usually called
tribal councils," the power to establish tribal courts, the power to
tax,"' the power to grant marriages and divorces, 9 the power to
provide for adoptions and guardianships," the power to regulate
hunting and fishing/ 1 the power to control economic development
through zoning regulations and other land-use planning devices,"
the power to administer justice with respect to all disputes and of-
fenses of or among members of the tribe, other than jurisdiction
34. COHEN, supra note 15, at 123.
35. See Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 78, 91, 92 (8th Cir. 1956), and cases
cited therein.
36. Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
37. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
38. Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958).
39. United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916).
40. Fisher v. District Ct., 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
41. Quechan Tribe v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1976).
42. Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 516 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1975).
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over crimes reserved to the federal courts43 or which may have
been transferred to the state pursuant to Public Law 280."
Indian tribes in western Oklahoma have been referred to as part
of a conglomerated mass, "Oklahoma Indian tribes," for several
decades, and the negative connotation of "Oklahoma Indian
tribes" in terms of tribal sovereignty makes analysis and com-
munication on these matters difficult because of the common ac-
ceptance of the category, even though there is no legal reason for
lumping all Indian tribes in Oklahoma into one legal category.
From an extensive review of existing statutory authority, there is
no compelling reason to reach a conclusion that the internal
sovereignty or the jurisdiction vested thereby in the tribes now
residing in western Oklahoma was generically different from any
other Indian tribe. The same statement would be true for any of
the other attributes of Indian sovereignty-the power to deter-
mine the form of government, to tax, to determine tribal member-
ship, and to regulate the use of property.
The Act of March 1, 1889,", creating a United States court in the
Indian Territory (which embraced the twelve reservations under
consideration here), did no violence to tribal sovereignty or its
concomitant civil and criminal jurisdiction. In fact, Sections 6 and
27 carefully preserved tribal jurisdiction. The Act makes specific
references to offenses committed within the Indian Territory as of-
fenses committed in Indian country.
Therefore, the statutes passed by Congress applicable to the
tribes in western Oklahoma are herein examined to determine the
sources of limitation on tribal powers. What is not expressly
limited remains within the domain of tribal sovereignty. The perti-
nent questions then become:
(1) Has the Congress by any legislative enactment expressly ex-
tinguished tribal civil and criminal jurisdictional powers in
western Oklahoma?
(2) Has the Congress granted the state of Oklahoma civil and
criminal jurisdiction over Indian country in western Oklahoma?
Dawes Severalty Act
In 1887, the General Allotment Act (Dawes Act or Dawes
Severalty Act)46 was passed, authorizing the allotment of tribal
43. Solicitor's Opinion, 55 I.D. 15 (1934).
44. Pub. L. 83-280, Act of Aug. 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 589, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1162
and 28 U.S.C. § 1360. See also Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965); Iron
Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 78 (8th Cir 1956).
45. Act of Mar. 1, 1889, 25 Stat. 783.
46. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 338, as amendedby Burke Act of May 18, 1906).
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lands to individual Indians or families. The allotment, or assimila-
tion period, in federal Indian law had begun in earnest.
The termination of the treaty relationship cleared the
way-or seemed to clear the way-for destroying the
separate status of the Indians in the United States. No longer
able to contest the will of the white man, as expressed
through the dictates of the Congress, the Indian waited to see
what the new era would bring. He had not long to wait. A
massive drive towards "severalty"- the breaking up of tribal
lands into individual units for distribution to the members of
the tribe-began which culminated in the Dawes Severalty
Act of 1887.)
The desire to open more land for settlement was undoubtedly
the primary motive for assimilation. However, the reformers, the
friends of the Indians, pushed for the Dawes Act for several other
reasons. They felt assimilation would replace tribal culture with
the preferred white civilization, and Indians on Indian allotments
would be easier to protect against railroad expansion and
unscrupulous whites (erroneously as it has turned out). The an-
nual report for the Board of Indian Commissioners for 1888 said
the Dawes Act "gives to the Indian the possibility to become a
man instead of remaining a ward of the government." There was
some official opposition to the law. Senator Teller of Colorado
declared with considerable accuracy,
You propose to divide all this land and give each Indian his
quarter section, or whatever he may have, and for twenty-
five years he is not to sell it, mortgage it, or dispose of it in
any shape, and at the end of that time he may sell it. It is safe
to predict that when that shall have been done, in thirty years
thereafter there will not be an Indian on the continent, or
there will be very few at least, that will have any land ......
The basic provisions of the Dawes Act were that (1) each family
head would be allotted 160 acres, every single person over 18 and
every orphan under 18 would get 80 acres, and every single person
under 18 would receive 40 acres; (2) every person was to choose
his own allotment, or failing that, an Indian Service official
would; (3) the federal government would hold title to the
allotments for twenty-five years or longer at the President's discre-
tion; (4) allottees' heirs would inherit according to the laws of the
47. Hearings Before Comm. on Indian Affairs on H.R. 7902, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 9
(1934) at pp. 428 etseq.
48. See CONG. REC. 783 (Jan. 20, 1881).
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state or territory; (5) citizenship would be conferred on allottees
who left their tribes and "adopted the habits of civilized life"; (6)
surplus tribal land after allotment could be sold to the United
States. The Act specifically excluded the Five Civilized Tribes, the
Osage, the Miami and Peoria, and the Sac and Fox in Indian Ter-
ritory.
The jurisdictional status of tribes allotted by the Act was con-
trolled by Section 6, which provided:
That upon the completion of said allotments and the
patenting of the lands to said allottees, each and every
member of the respective bands or tribes of Indians to whom
allotments have been made shall have the benefit of and be
subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the state or ter-
ritory in which they reside ....
This section as amended by the Burke Act on May 8, 1906,
clarified the jurisdictional status of the allottees and the allotted
land. The Act was designed "distinctly to postpone to the expira-
tion of the trust period the subjection of allottees under that act to
state laws." 9 This portion of the Act, codified at Section 349 of Ti-
tle 25 of the United States Code now reads:
At the expiration of the trust period and when the lands
have been conveyed to the Indians by patent in fee, as pro-
vided for in § 5 of this act, then each and every allottee shall
have the benefit of and be subject to the laws, both civil and
criminal, of the state or territory in which they may
reside; ... Provided further, that until the issuance of fee-
simple patents all allottees to whom trust patents shall
hereafter be issued shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the United States; and provided further, that the pro-
visions of this act shall not extend to any Indians in the In-
dian Territory.
It is clear that the act did not have any effect on the status of the
tribes' reservations, nor did it have any effect upon the inherent
authority of tribal governments to exercise civil and criminal
jurisdiction.' While the original pre-1906 allottees may have been
personally subject to state jurisdiction, state jurisdiction did not
extend to persons allotted after 1906, unallotted Indians, heirs of
any original allottees, or the allotments themselves until the trust
period expired for each and every allotment.' Thus, the General
49. United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442 (1914).
50. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973).
51. Solicitor's Opinion, 58 I.D. 455 (1943).
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Allotment Act had no effect on either the authority of tribal
governments or the area of exercise of that authority. Its only
jurisdictional effect, subjecting the original allottees to the per-
sonal jurisdiction of the state, is of no consequence at the present
time.
During the period from 1890 to 1907, three major events oc-
cupied a prominent place in the legal history of Indian tribes in
western Oklahoma. This period in history is murky, and the
detractors of tribal powers always make vague references to
something that happened in this era that eliminated tribal
sovereignty and jurisdiction. In fact, tribal sovereignty continued,
but the extent of Indian country was limited.
The Oklahoma Organic Act
The Oklahoma Organic Act of 1890 " organizing and estab-
lishing a temporary government for the Territory of Oklahoma,
carefully preserved tribal sovereignty and maintained the status
quo for the Indian tribes in western Oklahoma by providing:
That nothing in this act shall be construed to impair any right
now pertaining to any Indians or Indian tribes in said Ter-
ritory under the laws, agreements, and treaties of the United
States, or to impair the rights of person or property pertain-
ing to said Indians, or to affect the authority of the Govern-
ment of the United States to make any regulation or to make
any law respecting said Indians, their lands, property, or
other rights which it would have been competent to make or
enact if this act had not been passed.
The following exchange between Congressmen Mansur and
Turner during House debates describes the purpose of the
Oklahoma Territorial government and its application to the In-
dian tribes in Oklahoma:
Mr. MANSUR: Is the gentleman aware that the laws of the
United States in full force today make it a criminal offense to
take intoxicating liquor into the reservation of any Indians?
Mr. TURNER: But I suggest to the gentleman that this.is no
longer a reservation, but a Territory.
Mr. MANSUR: But I desire to remind the gentleman that, as
this bill expressly declares, this Territorial government or
organization is not for any Indian reservation whatever; it
does not apply to Indian reservations.'
52. Act of May 2, 1890, 26 Stat. 81.
53. 51 CONG. REC. 2104 (1890) (remarks of Mssrs. Mansur and Turner (emphasis added).
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Further amplifying the notion that the Congress intended the
Organic Act to apply to non-Indians only and leave the Indian
tribes undisturbed, Congressman Mansur, in pertinent part,
stated:
I challenge any gentleman on this floor-I care not who he
is-to take any one of the first twenty-four sections of this
bill and show where it touches a red man at all. I repeat, for I
would like to have it understood, that the first twenty-four
sections of this bill do not relate to a red man or to a tribe, do
not relate to the Indians in any manner whatever. The first
twenty-four sections relate to white men only, of whom there
are 200,000 in that Territory now asking for law and order
and legislation ....
Now, as to every Indian reservation within the whole
limits of the Indian territory as now organized, we say ex-
pressly that those first twenty-four sections of the act thus
organizing this Territorial government shall not apply.
Remember, gentlemen, we say in plain, clear language that,
as to every Indian tribe and as to the land of every Indian
tribe, none of these twenty-four sections which apply to the
white people shall operate. Remember, too, that if any white
man sells an Indian a drop of intoxicating liquor he is punished
under the severest penalties. The laws in that respect are am-
ple. 4
The language that ultimately became Section 12 of the 1890
Organic Act was originally included in the first drafts of the bill as
Section 8. Section 8 originally drafted limited access to the ter-
ritorial courts to members of Indian tribes. Congressman Hooker
offered an amendment to this language eliminating the word
"citizens" and inserting "any person residing in the Territory of
Oklahoma in whom there is Indian blood shall have the right to
invoke the aid of the courts therein for the protection of his per-
sonal property as if he were a citizen of the United States."
This amendment was later further amended to provide "person
or property" rather than personal property, and the proviso
preserving tribal jurisdiction added, but the language amending
Section 8 gives the clear implication that tribal rights were not to
be affected by the Act. This section confers upon a class of people
"in whom there is Indian blood" a nonmandatory right to invoke
the aid of courts established under the territorial act for their pro-
tection. It must be assumed that the federal side of the "district
54. id. at 2176.
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courts" convened to hear any cases occasioned by this jurisdic-
tional scheme for the simple reason that construction or applica-
tion of federal rather than territorial laws would apply.
This Act is the beginning point for the distinction between the
Indian tribes in the Oklahoma Territory (western Oklahoma) and
the Indian tribes in other parts (Indian Territory) of what
ultimately became the state of Oklahoma.
Section 12 of the Organic Act speaks specifically to the jurisdic-
tion of the territorial courts over Indians in in western Oklahoma.
It provides:
That jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the district courts
in the Territory of Oklahoma over all controversies arising
between members or citizens of one tribe or nation of Indians
and the members or citizens of other tribes or nations in the
Territory of Oklahoma, and any citizen or member of one
tribe or nation who may commit any offense or crime in said
Territory against the person or property of a citizen or
member of another tribe or nation shall be subject to the
same punishment in the Territory as he would be if both par-
ties were citizens of the United States; and any person
residing in the Territory of Oklahoma, in whom there is In-
dian blood, shall have the right to invoke the aid of courts
therein for the protection of his person or property, as
though he were a citizen of the United States: Provided, That
nothing in this act contained shall be so construed as to give
jurisdiction to the courts established in said Territory in con-
troversies arising between Indians of the same tribe, while
sustaining their tribal relations.
Section 12, taken in the sense most destructive of tribal jurisdic-
tion, gave the territorial courts concurrent jurisdiction over In-
dians only in intertribal matters, Le., where both parties were In-
dians but the controversy involved a tribal member versus a
nonmember. This section is susceptible to many different inter-
pretations, but with the most adverse interpretation, none of the
Indian tribes were denied jurisdiction over their members.
The opinion of the Department of the Interior contained in a let-
ter to the Attorney General interprets Section 12 in the following
manner:
In that part of the State which was Oklahoma Territory a
restricted Indian allotment continues to have the character of
Indian country in the same manner as restricted allotments
and reservations elsewhere in the country, with the possible
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exception of crimes committed by Indians against
nonmember Indians, which crimes are apparently within the
jurisdiction of the state courts as a result of the 1890 statute.
On these allotments both section 217 of title 25 and section
548 of title 18 apply. Crimes between Indians of the same
tribe which are not covered by section 548 remain subject to
tribal jurisdiction.'
It should be noted that all other statutes relating to Indian
jurisdiction utilize the term "Indian country" to designate the ter-
ritorial, limits of tribal and federal jurisdiction. Section 12 makes
no reference to Indian country. Notably, if an Indian against In-
dian offense or transaction occurs outside of Indian country, it is
the general rule that the state or territory has jurisdiction if no
essential Indian interest is involved and the Congress has not
reserved federal jurisdiction over the subject matter. Section 12 is
unique in this respect. The legislative history sheds little light on
the section. It can be concluded that the internal sovereignty of the
tribes was expressed although the unimpaired member jurisdiction
was preserved.
Section 12 can be described as a qualification of the plenary
tribal jurisdiction. However, it is not a significant qualification, as
the jurisdiction conferred on the territorial courts is not exclusive
jurisdiction. Therefore, if the tribes had exclusive jurisdiction over
all Indians within their boundaries prior to this Act, it is clear
from a review of the law that intertribal jurisdiction in the Indian
tribes is not extinguished but simply shared with the Territory
concurrently. That is truly a small usurpation of tribal jurisdic-
tion.
Thus, it can be stated with clarity that the creation of the Ter-
ritory of Oklahoma had little negative effect on the civil and
criminal jurisdictional powers of the Indian tribes in western
Oklahoma or on the internal sovereignty as expressed through the
power to establish judicial systems.
The Allotment Agreements
The second major event during this era was the subjection of all
twelve of the Indian reservations in western Oklahoma to an ex-
tensive allotment process. The statutes and agreements providing
for the allotment of virtually all tribal land to individual Indians,
coupled with cession subject to the allotments of the entire reser-
vation areas to the United States, undoubtedly severely limited the
55. Solicitor's Opinion, Memo. Sol. Dec. 17, 1935.
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territorial extent of Indian country in western Oklahoma. Assum-
ing, for analysis purposes, the least favorable interpretation of
these allotment agreements and their statutory confirmations, if
the reservation boundaries of all twelve reservations in western
Oklahoma were thereby disestablished, did these agreements and
statutes terminate or extinguish the powers of self-government
and internal sovereignty of the tribes? Are these tribal powers
coextensive with the reservation boundaries? Is it, ipso facto, no
reservation boundaries, no tribal powers?
These questions have been authoritatively answered by the
Supreme Court of the United States in DeCoteau v. District Coun-
ty Court." By treaty, the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation was
established in 1867 for the Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of the
Sioux Tribe of Indians. In 1891, Congress, by statute, ratified an
1889 Allotment Agreement between the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux
Tribe and the United States. The Act " provided that each Indian
would be allotted 160 acres pursuant to the General Allotment Act
and the remaining unallotted land was ceded to the United States.
The Sisseton-Wahpeton Agreement provided that the tribe agreed
to"cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the United States all their
claim, right, title, and interest in and to all the unallotted lands
within the limits of the reservation .... 58
The Sisseton-Wahpeton Agreement was included in a com-
prehensive act which ratified at the same time, among others, the
allotment agreements with three Indian tribes in western
Oklahoma-the Citizen Band Pottawatomie Agreement, the
Absentee Shawnee Agreement, and the Cheyenne and Arapaho
Agreement. The Supreme Court described the cession language of
these other agreements as "virtually identical to that in the
Sisseton-Wahpeton Agreement,"
The Court held that the 1891 Act confirming the language of the
Sisseton-Wahpeton Allotment Agreement had the effect of
disestablishing the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation and,
therefore, the state of South Dakota had jurisdiction over non-
Indian unallotted lands within the original reservation boun-
daries. More precisely stated, the South Dakota courts have
jurisdiction over that part of the former reservation that is not In-
dian country within the meaning of Section 1151 of Title 18. The
allotted land within the former reservation boundaries continues
under tribal jurisdiction pursuant to the Indian country definition
found in Section 1151(c). In other words, the disestablishment of
56. 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
57. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 989.
58. Id.
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the reservation boundaries places non-Indian unallotted lands out-
side the Section 1151(a) Indian country definition, but tribal
jurisdiction continues over the trust allotments as Indian country
under Section 1151(c).
The DeCoteau decision clearly stands for the proposition that,
unless the allotment agreement speaks to the extinguishment of
tribal governing powers, the internal sovereignty of an Indian
tribe survives the disestablishment of the reservation boundaries.
The Supreme Court summarized the jurisdictional status on
disestablished Indian reservations in the following manner:
It is true that the Sisseton-Wahpeton Agreement was unique
in providing for cession of all, rather than simply a major
portion of, the affected tribe's unallotted lands. But, as the
historical circumstances make clear, this was not because the
tribe wished to retain its former reservation, undiminished,
but rather because the tribe and the Government were
satisfied that retention of allotments would provide an ade-
quate fulcrum for tribal affairs. In such a situation, exclusive
tribal and federal jurisdiction is limited to the retained
allotments. 18 USC § 1151(c)."9
The congruity between the legal circumstances faced by the ma-
jority of Indian tribes in western Oklahoma and the extremes of
the legal aftermath occasioned by the disestablishment of the Lake
Traverse Indian Reservation makes DeCoteau a definite judicial
guidepost for those Indian tribes in Oklahoma whose reservations
have possibly been disestablished.
The jurisdictional history of the reservation involved in
DeCoteau almost tracks step by step the jurisdictional history for
Indian tribes in western Oklahoma. The same denial and vascilla-
tion is evident.
The recounting of the jurisdictional history could, with few
revisions, be that of most of the Indian tribes in western
Oklahoma. The DeCoteau Court states:
The jurisdictional history is not wholly clear, but it appears
that state jurisdiction over the ceded [iLe., unallotted] lands
went virtually unquestioned until the 1960's. The Lake
Traverse Reservation was eliminated from the maps published
by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs until 1908; thereafter,
some Government maps included the area as "open" or
"former" reservation, while more recent ones have
59. DeCoteau v. District County Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 442, 443 (1975).
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characterized it simply as a "reservation." Federal Indian
agents have remained active in the area, and Congress has
regularly appropriated funds for the tribe's welfare; the
unallotted Indian tracts have retained their "trust status pur-
suant to periodic Executive Orders .... In 1963, the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the 1891 Act had
terminated the reservation; in the process, the court noted
that "the highest court of that state [South Dakota] has
repeatedly held that South Dakota has jurisdiction," and that
the "Justice Department had taken a like position .... "'
The strength of the decision rests upon the unequivocal vindica-
tion of tribal sovereignty in spite of the lack of classical reserva-
tion status. The holding in DeCoteau was specifically followed in
United States ex rel. Cook v. Parkinson.61
It can be stated with clarity that even in adopting the most un-
favorable posture for analysis, the Indian tribes in western
Oklahoma are vested with jurisdiction over all Section 1151(b) or
(c) Indian country within the original reservation boundaries.
Enabling Act
The Oklahoma Enabling Act" contained two provisos relating
to jurisdiction over the person and property of Indians in western
Oklahoma, and as a result of these provisos, the Act had absolute-
ly no effect on the right of Indian tribes in western Oklahoma to
exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction in Indian country. Section
1, speaking to the preservation of Indian rights, declared:
Provided, that nothing contained in the said constitution
shall be construed to limit or impair the rights of persons or
property pertaining to the Indians of said Territories (so long
as such rights shall remain unextinguished) or limit or affect
the authority of the Government of the United States to make
any law or regulation respecting such Indians, their lands,
property or other rights by treaties, agreement, law or other-
wise which it would have been competent to make if this act
had never been passed.
The Oklahoma courts have consistently interpreted this section
to preserve federal authority over Indian matters after the admis-
sion of the state of Oklahoma to the Union. Neal v. Travelers In-
60. Id.
61. 396 F. Supp. 473 (1975).
62. Act of June 16, 1906, 34 Stat. 267.
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surance Co.,' and Ex parte Nowabbi," a case considering the
above quoted section in the context of federal versus state jurisdic-
tion over a murder occurring on a Choctaw allotment, held that
the federal constitutional requirement relating to admission of
states into the Union on an equal footing (equal footing doctrine)
does not preclude Congress from imposing conditions upon the
state of Oklahoma in the enabling act designed to protect tribal In-
dians and their property.
The section clearly provides that nothing contained in the con-
stitution to be adopted by the state of Oklahoma is to be con-
strued as limiting or impairing the rights of person or property of
the Indians residing in either Oklahoma or Indian Territory. Any
construction of the Oklahoma constitution must follow this man-
date. The right of person or property of a tribal Indian invariably
must relate both to rights guaranteed by federal law and to his um-
brella of rights flowing through and from his inherent status as a
member of a self-governing Indian tribe. The express recognition
and preservation of tribal jurisdictional powers in Section 12 of
the Organic Act is an example of what this proviso in the enabling
act sought to prohibit the Oklahoma constitution from limiting or
impairing.
Section 3 of the Act, third paragraph, required the Oklahoma
constitution to contain a disclaimer of title and jurisdiction over
Indian trust lands. Thus, when Oklahoma entered the Union, its
entry was expressly conditioned on the promise that the state
would
agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title
in or to... all lands lying within said limits owned or held by
any Indian, tribe, or nation; and that until the title to any
such public land shall have been extinguished by the United
States the same shall be and remain subject to the jurisdic-
tion, disposal and control of the United States ....
The language of the enabling act was adopted by the people of
Oklahoma by irrevocable ordinance and continued into
Oklahoma's own constitution as Article I, Section 3.
On this disclaimer clause the Supreme Court's decision in
Organized Village of Kake v. Egan,6" has been asserted as ap-
plicable to the western Oklahoma jurisdictional situation. In con-
sidering tribal, civil, and criminal jurisdiction, the site or locus in
63. 188 Okla. 131, 106 P.2d 811 (1940).
64. 50 Okla. Cr. 111, 61 P.2d 811 (1940).
65. 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
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quo of the act or transaction must be within Indian country for
federal and tribal jurisdiction to attach. An examination of that
case reveals that its facts render the holding inapplicable to the
western Oklahoma question for two sound reasons.
In Kake the Supreme Court held that federal jurisdiction as set
forth in the various disclaimer clauses of the enabling acts for at
least thirteen states did not invariably mean "exclusive" jurisdic-
tion and, therefore, did not preclude the exercise of residual state
authority.'6 However, that decision was rendered in a fishing
rights dispute between the state of Alaska and two Indian com-
munities organized pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934 ' who were exercising their fishing rights outside of Indian
country. In fact, neither of these Indian communities had ever had
an Indian reservation, constituting a locus in quo for the attach-
ment of tribal jurisdiction, established for them. These cir-
cumstances vary considerably from those in western Oklahoma
where the legal aftermath of the various allotment and cession
agreements affecting Indian reservations is the issue.
The import of the enabling act, then, is not in provisions affec-
ting tribal authority or the sphere of exercise of tribal power, as
there are none. Rather, the importance of this act as it affects In-
dian tribes is in the transfer of jurisdiction from the territorial
court system to the federal district courts or the state court.
Applying Section 12 of the Organic Act, it is clear that the state
courts succeeded to the intertribal jurisdiction of the territorial
courts. Governor Murray, in the 1953 letter discussed
previously," was stating the situation, as he understood it to be,
without the benefit of reviewing the congressional enactments
directly bearing on the jurisdictional question. Having had the
benefit of reviewing pertinent federal statutes, it is clear, under the
most rigorous jurisdictional test, that each of the Indian tribes in
western Oklahoma is vested with civil and criminal jurisdiction
over Indian country within their original reservation boundaries
as a matter of residual internal sovereignty, which Congress has
not expressly qualified other than in Section 12 of the Organic
Act, and each of the tribes has the continuing power to establish a
tribal court system for the administration of justice.
Stated in another way, the allotment of the various Indian reser-
vations in western Oklahoma coupled with the cessions to the
United States of the unallotted lands greatly diminished the
66. Id. at 71.
67. Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 984.
68. See Letter from Oklahoma Governor Johnston Murray to Assistant Secretary of the
Interior Orme Lewis (1963), in text at page 25.
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geographic area over which tribal, civil, and criminal jurisdiction
might be exercised, but the allotment and cession process did not
terminate tribal powers of self -government and each of the tribes
retained the legislative authority to provide for a tribal judicial
system.
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, while made inap-
plicable to the Oklahoma tribes through Section 13, is important
due to its later application to the tribes via the Oklahoma Indian
Welfare Act. Section 16 of the Act provides: "In addition to all
powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council by existing law,
the constitution adopted by said tribe shall also vest in such tribe
or its tribal council the following rights and powers ......
Thus, the Indian Reorganization Act did not limit the authority
of any tribe to exercise civil and criminal control within its
jurisdiction. Instead, the Act provided an alternative method, ac-
ceptable by the United States, for the organization of tribal
governments. Therefore, the provisions of the Act enumerating
certain tribal powers was neither a reduction or extension of tribal
authority, but was merely a statutory confirmation of those
rights.69
Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act (1936)
The Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act,'" essentially a supplement to
the Indian Reorganization Act, was enacted in 1936 to provide for
the general welfare of the Indians of the state of Oklahoma. In
Section 3 of the Act, Congress provided that:"The Secretary of the
Interior may issue to any such organized group a charter of in-
corporation .... Such charter may convey to the incorporated
group ... [the right to]... enjoy any other rights and privileges
secured to an organized Indian tribe under the Act of June, 1934. ""
In addition, all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this act were
expressly repealed. Thus, it would appear that the exclusionary
clause of the Indian Reorganization Act excluding Oklahoma
tribes from the provisions of the Act was repealed and, therefore,
the powers of the Indian tribes in Oklahoma were statutorily con-
firmed to the same degree as those of any other Indian tribe.
69. COHEN. supra note 15, at 126. See also Solicitor's Opinion, 55 I.D. 15 (1934).
70. Act of June 26, 1936, 49 Stat. 1967.
71. Indian Reorganization Act, June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 984.
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Presumably, the tribes of western Oklahoma could include in
their constitutions provisions enabling them to exert those powers
listed in the Solicitor's Opinion' relating to the powers of Indian
tribes as these tribes are previously recognized tribes as evidenced
by their entry into treaty relationships with the United States.73 As
a result of such powers, each tribe is vested with the authority to
establish and maintain a tribal judicial system or judicial branch of
tribal government'
Public Law 83-280 (Act ofAugust 15, 1953)
The termination policy of the early 1950's resulted in Public
Law 280,/ which conferred jurisdiction to the states of California,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin, except for specified
reservations, over all criminal acts, civil causes of action, and civil
laws of general application, with the exception of certain
enumerated civil actions. The Act also provided that any state
whose enabling act and constitution contained disclaimers of
jurisdiction over Indians was given permission to amend its con-
stitution and assume jurisdiction. However, no such state was
allowed to assume jurisdiction unless and until its constitution had
been amended.
Governor Murray's letter to Orme Lewis expressed the general-
ly held presumption against Indian tribes exerting jurisdcition in
the following language:
When Oklahoma became a State, all tribal governments
within its boundaries became merged in the State and the
tribal codes under which the tribes were governed prior to
statehood were abandoned and all Indian tribes, with respect
to criminal offense and civil causes, came under State
jurisdiction.
Therefore, Public Law No. 280 will not in any way affect
the Indian citizens of this State.76
While Governor Murray's presumptions as to the demise of
tribal codes, the demise of most governmental functions, and
Oklahma's succession to jurisdiction may be true for that portion
72. Solicitor's Opinion, 55 I.D. 15 (1934).
73. Solicitor's Opinion, M-36783 (1969).
74. Establishment of Tribal Judicial System, Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe, Field
Solicitor's Opinion, Aberdeen Office, BIA, June 9, 1972 (App. at 21).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1970).
76. Murray Letter, supra note 68.
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of the state which comprised the Indian Territory,77 there is no
authority for the presumption that those tribal governments in
western Oklahoma (the old Oklahoma Territory) ceased to func-
tion or that their authority to enact and enforce tribal laws had
been impeded in any significant way. Thus, Oklahoma has never
acted to amend its constitution or otherwise comply with the re-
quirements of Public Law 280 and has not obtained any jurisdic-
tion thereunder.78 It should be noted at this point that Public Law
280 was amended by Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,' to
require the consent of the tribe, by special referendum, before a
state may acquire jurisdiction.
Can an Indian tribe unilaterally and voluntarily vest a state
with civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian country? In
Kennerly v. District Court,' the Court held the Williams v. Led'
test inapplicable to the situation presented because the Williams
test was predicated upon determining the power of states to act in
the absence of congressional authority to regulate matters affec-
ting Indians, in contrast to the Kennerly case wherein "a govern-
ing Act of Congress" was in effect at the time of the decision, that
is, Public Law 280.
The Kennerly decision stands for the proposition that the
statutory requirements for assuming civil and criminal jurisdiction
over Indian country within a state by that state must be strictly
adhered to if state jurisdiction is to be effectuated. In Kennerly,
the tribal council voted to give the state concurrent jurisdiction
resulting in the argument by the state of Montana that the
Williams test was met in that the state action did not impinge on
tribal self-government. The Supreme Court rejected that argu-
ment.
On Public Law 280, Williams says that Arizona has not voted
to accept such responsibility but rather applies the infringement
test. Kennerly says the infringement test is not proper in the in-
stance where a "governing Act of Congress" is in effect. Therefore,
Oklahoma, by not complying with the requirements to assume
jurisdiction as mandated by Congress, has not had any jurisdic-
tion conferred upon it by Public Law No. 83-280 and would
presently be required to acquire the consent of each individual
tribe prior to assuming jurisdiction over that tribe.
77. See Curtis Act of June 28, 1898, 30 Stat. 495; Act of Apr. 26, 1906, 34 Stat. 137.
78. United States v. Littlechief, reported in State v. Littlechief, 573 P.2d 263 (Okla. Cr.
1978).
79. Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 406, 82 Stat. 78 (1968).
80. 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
81. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
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In dian Civil Rights Act (April 11, 1 968P2
The idea that the civil liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights
of the United States Constitution were inapplicable to tribal
governments was strikingly confirmed by the case of Talton v.
Mayes.' The court stated: "It follows that as the powers of local
self-government enjoyed by the Cherokee Nation existed prior to
the Constitution, they are not operated upon by the Fifth Amend-
ment .... "s Therefore, while tribal authority was subject to
limitations imposed by congressional legislation, it was not bound
by the United States Constitution as amended.
In 1968 Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,
Title II of which defined certain rights guaranteed to Indian in-
dividuals. This Act placed a number of limitations on the authori-
ty of the tribal governments to enact and enforce tribal legislation.
Because this Act imposes the most limitations on the Oklahoma
tribes governmental authority, it is included herein in its entirety:
TITLE II-RIGHTS OF INDIANS
Definitions
Sec. 201. For the purposes of this title, the term-
(1) "Indian tribe" means any tribe, band, or other group of
Indians subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and
recognized as possessing powers of self-government;
(2) "Powers of self-government" means and includes all
governmental powers possessed by an Indian tribe, ex-
ecutive, legislative, and judicial, and all offices, bodies, and
tribunals by and through which they are executed, including
courts of Indian offenses: and
(3) "Indian court" means any Indian tribal court or court of
Indian offense.
Indian Rights
Sec. 202. No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-
government shall-
(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of
religion, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to peti-
tion for a redress of grievances:
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable search
82. Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 406, 82 Stat. 78 (1968).
83. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
84. Id. at 382-84.
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and seizures, nor issue warrants, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized;
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy;
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself:
(5) take any private property for a public use without just
compensation:
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to
a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses
against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and at his own expense to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense;
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict
cruel and unusual punishments, and in no event impose for
conviction of any one offense any penalty or punishment
greater than imprisonment for a term of six months or a fine
Of $500, or both:
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or proper-
ty without due process of law;
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or
(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable
by imprisonment the right, upon request, to a trial by jury of
not less than six persons.
It should be noted that while the Indian Civil Rights Act im-
poses many of the restrictions of the Bill of Rights on the tribal
government, some portions of the Bill of Rights were specifically
deleted, such as the provisions prohibiting the establishment of
religion and the right to appointed council. These deletions leave
the tribal government free to act in these areas in whatever man-
ner it determines to be in the best interest of the tribe.
The Supreme Court has recently held that the Indian Civil
Rights Act' does not constitute and express or implied congres-
sional authorization for a civil suit against a tribe or its officers.'
In holding that tribal immunity from suit in civil matters was not
waived by the Act, the Court stated:
Title I of the ICRA does not expressly authorize the bringing
of civil action for declaratory or injunctive relief to enforce
85. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).
86. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 98 S.Ct. 1670 (1978).
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its substantive provisions. The threshold issue in this case is
thus whether the Act may be interpreted to impliedly
authorize such actions, against a tribe or its officers, in the
federal courts. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that
the Act cannot be so read."
The significant limitation placed on the tribal governments by this
Act is the limitation of authorized punishments. Thus, should the
tribe mandate a fine or imprisonment as punishment for any par-
ticular crime, the maximum allowable punishment is a $500 fine,
or imprisonment for a term not to exceed six months, or both.
However, as to other punitive measures, the only significant
limitation is the limitation against cruel and unusual punishment.
While the Indian Civil Rights Act limits the authority of the
tribes and imposes certain of the guarantees of the United States
Bill of Rights, the federal courts have not construed the Act to im-
pose upon the tribes the decisional law construing the Bill of
Rights as applied to the federal government. For example, it would
seem that if a tribe has traditionally used restitution as a method
of punishment for adultery, then restitutionary measures in excess
of $500 might be approved as not being a fine and not constituting
cruel and unusual punishment. In short, the provisions of the Act
are generally construed against the background of tribal tradition
and law instead of United States case law,' and, while a significant
limitation on tribal authority, speaks more toward the procedural
processes a tribe is required to follow than to the tribe's authority
to enact substantive law.
The Effect of the Legislative Enactments
Analysis of the pertinent congressional enactments from a
posture most detrimental to tribal governmental authority reveals
that the Congress has imposed the following limitations and
qualifications upon the tribes residing in the old Oklahoma Ter-
ritory:
I. Limitations of Tribal Authority
A. Substantive Limitations
1. Congress has assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the follow-
ing offenses;
(a) murder, 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(b) manslaughter, 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(c) rape, as defined by state law, 18 U.S.C. § 1153
87. Id. at 1671.
88. Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971); McCurdy v. Steele, 353 F.
Supp. 629 (D.C. Utah 1973).
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(d) carnal knowledge of any female, not his wife, who has not
attained the age of sixteen years, 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(e) assault with intent to commit rape, as defined by state law,
18 U.S.C. § 1153
(f) incest, as defined by state law, 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(g) assault with intent to kill, 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(h) assault with a dangerous weapon, as defined by state law, 18
U.S.C. § 1153
(i) arson, 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(j) burglary, as defined by state law, 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(k) robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(I) larceny, 18 U.S.C. § 1153
2. Congress has decreed that no Indian tribe in exercising
powers of self-government shall-
(a) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of
religion, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(1)
(b) make or enforce any law abridging the freedom of speech, 25
U.S.C. § 1302(1)
(c) make or enforce any law abridging the freedom of the press,
25 U.S.C. § 1302(1)
(d) make or enforce any law abridging the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances,
25 U.S.C. § 1302(1)
(e) take any private property for a public use without just com-
pensation, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(5)
(f) 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of its laws, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8)
(g) deprive any person of liberty or property without due pro-
cess of law, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8)
(h) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law, 25 U.S.C. §
1302(9)
B. Procedural Limitations. Congress has decreed that no Indian
tribe, in exercising the powers of self-government shall-
1. violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable search and
seizures, nor issue warrants, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the person or thing to be seized, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(2)
2. subject any personn for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(3)
3. compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(4)
4. require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and
unusual punishment, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7)
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5. in no event impose for conviction of any one offense any
penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of six
months, or a fine of $500, or both, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7)
6. deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by im-
prisonment the right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less
than six persons, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(10)
II. Qualifications of Tribal Authority
A. Oklahoma Organic Act § 12 and Oklahoma Enabling Act §
17. The combined force of these provisions conferred on the state
courts of the state of Oklahoma concurrent jurisdiction with tribal
authorities over those civil and criminal cases not exclusively
vested in the federal courts, if, but only if, the cause arose from a
controversy involving citizens or members of different, nonaf-
filiated tribes or nations. This jurisdiction is not exclusive and
does not apply at all in controversies involving members of the
same or affiliated tribes.
B. Indian Civil Rights Act
1. The Indian Civil Rights Act extends the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus to any person wishing to test the legality of his
detention by order of an Indian tribe. The writ will be heard in
federal court, 25 U.S.C. § 1303.
2. The United States Supreme Court has held that the Indian
Civil Rights Act does not, by implication, create a limited waiver
of the sovereign immunity of the tribal government when it is
alleged that the tribal government has violated the provisions of
the Act.8"
This ruling as it relates to western Oklahoma is stated by Judge
Luther B. Eubanks: "Nevertheless, a United States District Court
does, in a proper case, have jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to
a tribal election process where the effect of that process has been
to deny a tribal member's civil rights."'"
This analysis indicates that while certain of the fundamental
rights of self-government possessed by the western Oklahoma
tribes has been limited or qualified by acts of Congress, these
tribes are not more limited, in any significant degree, than any
federally recognized tribe outside the border of the state of
Oklahoma. The only difference in the authority of the western
89. See Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976) (equal protec-
tion ); Crowe v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Inc., 506 F.2d 1231 (4th Cir. 1974)
(equal protection); Laramie v. Nicholson, 487 F.2d 315 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 871 (1974) (equal protection); O'Neil v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140
(8th Cir. 1973) (tribal immunity); White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973)
(voting rights).
90. Johnson v. Little Axe, Chairman of the Absentee-Shawnee Tribe of Indians of
Oklahoma, No. CIV 77-0249-E (May 24,1977).
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Oklahoma tribes and non-Oklahoma federally recognized tribes,
is that the western Oklahoma tribes exert jurisdiction over crimes
or controversies arising between citizens or members of different
nonaffiliated tribes or nations concurrently with the state instead
of exclusively.
Subject to the limitations imposed by the Indian Civil Rights
Act and the Major Crimes Act, the legally constituted governmen-
tal bodies of the tribes of western Oklahoma retain exclusive
authority to:
1. determine their form of government,
2. establish tribal courts and to employ tribal police,
3. to adopt a tribal law and order code,
4. to undertake correction functions,
5. to undertake programs aimed at preventing adult and
juvenile delinquency,
6. to undertake adult and juvenile rehabilitation programs,
7. to enact and enforce a civil code,
8. provide for adoption and guardianships,
9. to tax and collect taxes,
10. to regulate hunting and fishing,
11. to grant marriages and divorces,
12. to control economic development through zoning regula-
tions and other land use planning devices,
13. to exert the power of eminent domain,
14. to administer justice with respect to all offenses and disputes
JURISDICTION OF CRIMES COMMITTED IN "INDIAN COUNTRY"
WITHIN THE FORMER OKLAHOMA TERRITORY
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*For purposes of this chart, a major crime having a victim is defined as any of the 13
crimes listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970).
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of or among members of the tribe, other than those offenses
reserved to the federal courts,
15. to exercise all other powers of an Indian tribe as recognized
by the Solicitor in 55 I.D. 15 (1934).
Indian Country
The term "Indian country" was first authoritatively defined by
the Act of June 30, 1834," 1 which provided:
That all that part of the United States west of the Mississip-
pi, and not within the states of Missouri and Louisiana, or
the territory of Arkansas, and, also, that part of the United
States east of the Mississippi River, and not within any state,
to which the Indian title has not been extinguished, for the
purposes of this Act, be taken and deemed Indian country,
In the leading case, Bates v. Clark," the Supreme Court had oc-
casion to discuss the Act of June 30, 1834, saying:
What, then, is Indian country, within the meaning of the
acts of Congress regulating intercourse with the
Indian?... The simple criterion is that as to all the lands thus
described it was Indian country whenever the Indian title had
not been extinguished, and it continued to be Indian country
so long as the Indians had title to it, and no longer. As soon
as they parted with the title, it ceased to be Indian country,
without any further act of Congress, unless by the treaty by
which the Indians parted with their title, or by some act of
Congress, a different rule was made applicable to the case. 3
Although this section was not reenacted when the United States
statutes were revised (resulting in its repeal) it has provided a
useful basis for defining Indian country during aperiod in which
there was no statutory definition."
In Cohen's FederalIndian Law, "Indian country" is defined as:
Although the "Indian country" has been used in many
senses, it may perhaps be most usefully defined as country
within which Indian laws and customs and federal laws
relating to Indians are generally applicable ....
91. 4 Stat. 729 (1834).
92. 95 U.S. 204 (1871).
93. Id. at 206.
94. Clairmont v. United States, 225 U.S. 551 (1912); United States v. LeBris, 121 U.S.
278(1887).
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The greater part, however, of the body of federal Indian
law and tribal law applies only to certain areas which have a
peculiar relation to the Indians and which in their totality
comprise the Indian country ....
The Indian country at any particular time must be viewed
with reference to the existing body of federal and tribal law."5
In the intervening years between the repeal of the 1834 act and
the 1948 statutory codification of the definition as it evolved on a
case-by-case basis, a number of important decisions were made
regarding the Indian country character of Indian reservations
carved out of public domain and individually held allotted lands.
These matters are important in that in at least one case involving
Indian lands in western Oklahoma it was urged that the "Indian
country" definition applied only to lands held in "original" Indian
title, meaning those lands which are the aboriginal homelands of a
particular tribe. It was further urged that if these lands set aside
for Indian use were not held in aboriginal title, no Indian title at-
tached and the Indian title would be deemed extinguished, thereby
eliminating the Indian country character of the lands. This notion
was laid to rest in Donnelly v. United States.96 On this matter, the
Court states:
Under these decisions, the definition as contained in the act
of 1834 may still "be referred to in connection with the provi-
sions of its original context that remain in force, and may be
considered in connection with the changes which have taken
place in our situation, with a view of determining from time
to time what must be regarded as Indian country where that
was formerly subject to the Indian occupancy, the case cited
furnish a criterion for determining what is "Indian country."
But "the changes which have taken place in our situation" are
so numerous and so material, that the term cannot now be
confined to land formerly held by the Indians, and to which
their title remains unextinguished. And, in our judgment,
nothing can more appropriately be deemed "Indian country",
within the meaning of those provisions of the Revised Statute
that relate to the regulation of the Indians and the govern-
ment of the Indian country, than a tract of land that, being a
part of the public domain, is lawfully set apart as an Indian
reservation.'
95. COHEN, supra note 15, at 5.
96. 228 U.S. 243 (1913).
97. Id. at 269.
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The question of whether Indian allotments carved out of the
tribal estate and allotted to individuals retained their Indian coun-
try character was laid to rest in United States v. Pelican,' and
later in a case from Oklahoma, United States v. Ramsey." These
cases are more fully discussed later in the section on Indian coun-
try jurisdiction.
In 1948, Congress enacted a comprehensive statutory definition
of Indian country, which is codified at Section 1151 of Title 18 of
the United States Code. It provides:
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of
this title, the term "Indian country", as used in this chapter,
means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation
under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, not-
withstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including
rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all depen-
dent Indian communities within the borders of the United
States whether within the original or subsequently acquired
territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of
a state, and (c) all Indian allotments the Indian titles to which
have not been extinguished including rights-of-way running
through the same.
In order to *understand the parameters of what is and what is not
"Indian country," however, it is necessary to understand that the
language of Sections 1151, 1152, and 1153 did not become effec-
tive until June of 1948.
Prior to 1948, Section 2145 of the Revised Statutes'" read: "Ex-
cept as to crimes the punishment of which is expressly provided
for in this title, the punishment of crimes committed in any place
within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States,
shall extend to the Indian country."
Section 1152 did not make any important change in the
language of the law prior to 1948:
The preceding section [Sec. 2145] shall not be construed to
extend to crimes committed by one Indian against the person
or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing
any offense in the Indian country who has been punished by
the local law of the tribe, or to any case where by treaty
stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or
may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively.'
98. 232 U.S. 442 (1914).
99. 271 U.S. 467 (1926).
100. 25 U.S.C. § 217 (1875).
101. Rev. Stat. § 2146,25 U.S.C. § 218 (1875).
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And, finally, instead of Section 1153, there stood Section 9 of
the Act of March 3, 1885,0' which constituted a specific exception
to Section 2146 of the Revised Statutes.
Sec. 9 (Indians committing certain crimes in Territories,
etc., subject to laws thereof-in States and Indian reserva-
tions, to what laws subject.) That immediately upon and
after the date of the passage of this act all Indians, commit-
ting against the person or property of another Indian or
another person any of the following crimes, namely, murder,
manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson,
burglary, and larceny within any Territory of the United
States, and either within or without an Indian reservation,
shall be subject therefor to the laws of such Territory relating
to said crimes, and shall be tried therefor in the same courts
and in the same manner and shall be subject to the same
penalties as are all other persons charged with the commis-
sion of said crimes, respectively; and the said courts are
hereby given jurisdiction in all such cases; and all such In-
dians committing any of the above crimes against the person
or property of another Indian or other person within the
boundaries of any State of the United States, and on and
within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdic-
tion of the United States Government, shall be subject to the
same laws, tried in the same courts and in the same manner,
and subject to the same penalties as are all other persons
committing any of the above crimes within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States.
The statutes of the United States pertaining to jurisdiction over
criminal causes of action, and the case law interpreting those
statutes become more lucid, if, and only if, one carefully (a)
segregates each of the statutes set out above by the date of their
enactment; (b) notes the date at which any cause of action arises;
(c) characterizes, as Indian or non-Indian, both the alleged victim
and the alleged offender; and (d) understands the legal character
of the land upon which the cause arises.
Moreover, it must always be carefully borne in mind that the
congressional definition of "Indian country" is trip tite in form;
that Congress has chosen to include within that definition (1)
reservation lands, "under the jurisdiction ofthe United States
Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent"; (2)
"dependent Indian communities"; and (3) Indian allotments, the
102. Major Crimes Act, as amended23 Stat. 385 (1885).
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"Indian titles to which have not been extinguished."' 3 Failure to
ascertain under which part of this tripartite definition one ought
properly to assert one's jurisdictional claim is nothing less than an
open invitation to definitional disaster.
Although on its face, Section 1151 defines "Indian country"
solely for criminal jurisdictional purposes, it is clear from an ex-
amination of the judicial treatment of Indian country definitions
since the 1948 adoption of Section 1151 that the courts consider
the Indian country definition contained therein to apply regardless
of whether the subject-matter jurisdiction is civil or criminal.'"
This treatment of Section 1151 by the court has been supported
by the Congress because a comparison of post-1948 statutory
enactments pertaining to state assumption of criminal and civil
jurisdiction over Indians reveals that Congress subscribes to the
Section 1151 definition of Indian country for both criminal and
civil jurisdiction purposes."
The discussion of whether this statutory definition of Indian
country categorically includes the land holdings of Indian tribes in
western Oklahoma turns specifically on the status of these lands as
reservation lands, dependent Indian commuhities, and allotments.
Definition of Section 1151(a) Jurisdiction
Section 1151 defines "Indian country" as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of
this title, the term "Indian country," as used in this chapter
[§§ 1151-1165 of this title], means (a) all land within the
limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of
any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the
reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the
borders of the United States whether within the original or
subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within
or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments
the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished. °
103. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970).
104. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 177, 178 n.17
(1973); Kennerly v. District Ct., 400 U.S. 423,424 n.1 (1971).
105. Compare, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (criminal) with 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (civil), both in-
cluded in the Act of Aug. 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588, 589. There is an undifferentiated use of the
term "Indian country" in these statutes. See also H.R. REP. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 6
(1953). While the tribal jurisdiction has extraterritorial reaches similar to the jurisdiction of
a state, and § 1151 is concerned, on its face, only with criminal jurisdiction, the Court has
recognized that it generally applies as well to questions of civil jurisdiction. DeCoteau v.
District County Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975).
106. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1, 62 Stat. 75; Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 25, 63
Stat. 94.
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Thus, as the Supreme Court spelled out in DeCoteau v. District
County Court"0 7:
If the lands in question are within a continuing "reservation",
jurisdiction is in the tribe and the Federal Government "not-
withstanding the issliance of any patent, [such jurisdiction]
including rights-of-way running through the reservation." 18
U.S.C. § 1151(a). On the other hand, if the lands are not
within a continuing reservation, jurisdiction is in the State,
except for those land parcels which are"Indian allotments,
the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, in-
cluding rights-of-way running through the same." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1151(c)"M
And:
While § 1151 is concerned, on its face, only with criminal
jurisdiction, the Court has recognized that it generally ap-
plies as well to questions of civil jurisdiction. McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Comm'n; Kennerly v. District Court of
Montana; Williams v. Lee. 'N [Citations omitted. ]
Of course, this enunciation of the law, as it is today, only has
real significance (apart from the thrust of Section 1151(c)) if reser-
vations are found still to exist in the state of Oklahoma.
It is this writer's belief that recent rulings by the Supreme Court
in DeCoteau, Seymour, '° Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kniep,"' and
Mattz v. Arnett,"' justify a complete reassessment of the effect of
agreements, consummated in pursuance of the General Allotment
Act, upon the reservation status of Indian lands.
Those rulings make it quite clear that: "A Congressional deter-
mination to terminate [a reservation] must be expressed on the
face of the Act or be clear from the surrounding circumstances and
legislative history. '1111
Nor, the Supreme Court asserts, will it lightly conclude that an
Indian reservation has been terminated."' And:"When Congress
has once established a reservation all tracts included within it re-
main a part of the reservation until separated therefrom by Con-
gress." ' 5
107. 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
108. Id. at 472. n.2.
109. .at 304 n.2.
110. Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
111. 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
112. 412 U.S. 481 (1973).
113. Id. at 505.
114. DeCoteau v. District County Ct., 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
115. United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 285 (1909).
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Moreover, the congressional intent to so separate them
therefrom "must be clear, to overcome 'the general rule that'
doubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak and
defenseless people who are the wards of the nation, dependent
upon its protection and good faith.""'
Certainly, the Court will not read such an intent into the
General Allotment Act of 1887. According to the Supreme Court:
That Act permitted the President to make allotments of
reservation lands to resident Indians and, with tribal consent,
to sell surplus lands. Its policy was to continue the reserva-
tion system and the trust status of Indian lands, but to allot
tracts to individual Indians for agriculture and grazing.
When all the lands had been allotted and the trust expired,
the reservation could be abolished. Unallotted lands were
made available to non-Indians with the purpose, in part, of
promoting interaction between the races and of encouraging
Indians to adopt white ways. See § 6 of the General Allot-
ment Act, 24 Stat. 390; United States Department of the In-
terior, Federal Indian Law, 115-117, 127-129, 776-777
(1958)."'
The General Allotment Act, says the Supreme Court in
DeCoteau, was simply "an attempt to reconcile the government's
responsibility for the Indians' welfare with the desire of non-
Indians to settle upon reservation lands.""' The Act really did no
more than empower the President "to allot portions of reservation
land to tribal members and, with tribal consent, to sell the surplus
lands to white settlers, with the proceeds of these sales being
dedicated to the Indians' benefit....9 It is, therefore, equally certain
"that reservation status may survive the opening of a reservation
to settlement, even when the moneys paid for the land by the set-
tlers [is] all placed in trust by the Government for the Indians'
benefit.'".
As continuing reservation status is not inconsistent with the
opening of a reservation to settlement, because, in fact, it was part
of the grand design behind the General Allotment Act both to
maintain reservation status while opening Indian lands to settle-
ment, the existence of patent land, Indian or non-Indian, within a
116. DeCoteau v. District County Ct., 420 U.S. 425 (1975), quoting from McClanahan
v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
117. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973).
118. DeCoteau v. District County Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 432 (1975).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 444.
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reservation's boundaries will not result in a termination of that
status. In fact, says the Court, the presence of non-Indian patented
land will not even work an alteration in reservation boundaries:
The State [of Washington] urges that we interpret the
words "notwithstanding the issuance of any patent" to mean
only notwithstanding the issuance of any patent to an Indian.
But the State does not suggest, nor can we find, any adequate
justification for such an interpretation. Quite the contrary, it
seems to us that the strongest argument against the exclusion
of patented lands from an Indian reservation applies with
equal force to patents issued to non-Indians and Indians
alike. For that argument rests upon the fact that where the ex-
istence or nonexistence of an Indian reservation, and
therefore the existence or non-existence of federal jurisdic-
tion, depends upon the ownership of particular parcels of
land, law enforcement officers operating in the area will find
it necessary to search tract books in order to determine
whether criminal jurisdiction over each particular offense,
even though committed within the reservation, is in the State
or Federal Government. Such an impractical pattern of
checkerboard jurisdiction was avoided by the plain language
of § 1151 and we see no justification for adopting an unwar-
ranted construction of that language where the result would
be merely to recreate confusion Congress specifically sought
to avoid. '
Furthermore, says the Supreme Court in DeCoteau, even a ces-
sion of lands, so long as it is not a cession of all unallotted lands,
will not result in a termination of the reservation:
The Congress included the Sisseton-Wahpeton agreement
in a comprehensive Act which also ratified several other
agreements providing for the outright cession of surplus
reservation lands to the Government. The other agreements
employed cession language virtually identical to that in the
Sisseton-Wahpeton Agreement, but in these other cases the
Indians sold only a described portion of their lands, rather
than all "unallotted" portions, the result being merely a
reduction in the size of the affected reservation.'"
Should there be any doubt as to whether these new decisions
must occasion a rethinking of case law precedent in the state of
121. Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
122. DeCoteau v. District County Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 439 -40 (1975).
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Oklahoma, it is suggested the Supreme Court's assessment of the
purpose behind the treaties incident to the General Allotment Act
be compared with the assessment of that purpose made by the
Tenth Circuit in Ellis v. Page: "The treaty evinces a manifest pur-
pose to dissolve tribal government and assimilate the Indian allot-
tees in the community in which they lived as citizens and owners
of land with a grubstake to enable them to compete on an equal
footing with their non -Indian neighbors.""'
Or, one might reread the opinion of Judge Murrah in Tooisgah
v. United States,'24 holding that because of the partial cession by
the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache (the tribes excepted from ces-
sion 480,000 acres of grazing lands), "it cannot be doubted that
Congress thereby intended to ... disestablish the organized reser-
vation, and assimilate the Indian tribes as citizens of the state or
territory"'" and contrast it with what the Supreme Court in
DeCoteau appears to believe the result of partial cession to be.
Application of Section 1151(a) Jurisdiction to Western Oklahoma
In determining whether the allotment agreements or statutes
allotting the western Oklahoma tribes disestablished or dimin-
ished their reservations, general principles of statutory construc-
tion must be applied.
Only Congress can disestablish, diminish, or alter the boun-
daries of an Indian reservation. The Court has ruled that when a
reservation has once been established, all tracts included within it
"remain a part of the reservation until separated therefrom by
Congress."'26
The premise imposes on the state the burden of pointing to any
federal action that disestablished the Oklahoma reservations as
described in the applicable treaties, or that in some way altered or
diminished the boundaries of those reservations. Unless the allot-
ment agreements constitute such federal action, the state does not
have jurisdiction.
Courts will not lightly impute to Congress an intent to abridge
or abrogate Indian treaty rights or statutory rights. Indian tribes
have a special relationship with the United States. Chief Justice
John Marshall described tribes as "domestic dependent nations"
and characterized their relationship with the United States as that
123. 351 F.2d 250 (10th Cir. 1965).
124. 186 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1950).
125. Id. at 97, 98.
126. United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 285 (1909). See also Mattz v. Arnett, 412
U.S. 481, 504, 505 (1973); Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 359 (1962).
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of a ward to its guardian.'27 Seminole Nation v. United State"'l
enunciates the duty imposed on the United States and its courts in
dealings with Indian tribes.
Under a humane and self-imposed policy which has found ex-
pression in many acts of Congress and numerous decisions of
this Court, the United States has charged itself with moral
obligations of the highest responsibility and trust. Its con-
duct, as disclosed in the acts of those who represent it in deal-
ings with the Indians, should therefore be judged by the most
exacting fiduciary standards.
Flowing from this recognition of the Indian's special status, the
Supreme Court has posited "the settled rule that, as between the
whites and the Indians, the laws are to be construed most
favorably to the latter."'2 9
Doubtful provisions of statutes are resolved in the Indian's
favor. Although Congress has general plenary power over its In-
dian wards,'" the intention of Congress to abridge or abrogate
rights or benefits secured to a tribe by treaty must be very clear.''
Determination of the effect of the allotment acts must start with
these general guiding principles. To these general principles, Mattz
and Seymour add four specific rules for construction of statutes
which open for settlement the surplus and unallotted lands within
Indian reservations: (1) The language of the statute disestablishing,
diminishing, or altering a reservation "must be expressed on the
face of the Act or be clear from the surrounding circumstances and
legislative history";' 3 " (2) statutory failure to lessen federal trust
responsibility for Indians having tribal rights on the reservation
shall be construed as an intent to maintain the existence of the
reservation undiminished; (3) subsequent enactments of Congress
recognizing the continued existence of a reservation support the
127. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
128. 316 U.S. 286, 296, 297 (1942).
129. Red Bird v. United States, 203 U.S. 76, 94 (1906). See also McClanahan v. Arizona
Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 160, 174 (1973); Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631
(1970); Peoria Tribe v. United States, 390 U.S. 468, 472-73 (1968); United States v. Santa Fe
Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 354 (1941); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930); Alaska
Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 79 (1918); United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S.
278, 290 (1909); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908); The Kansas Indians, 72 US.
737 (1866); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 585 (1832); COHEN, supra note 15,
at 37.
130. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
131. The intention to abrogate or modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to the Con-
gress. Pigeon River Improvement Co. v. Cox, 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934). See also
Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968).
132. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481,505 (1973).
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construction that the opening for settlement statute did not alter
or diminish the reservation; and (4) construction and treatment of
the opening for settlement statute by the officials and attorneys of
the Department of Interior, the agency of government having
primary responsibility for Indian affairs, shall be accorded special
weight and consideration.
The task facing any Indian tribe which seeks to prove that its
reservation status remains unimpaired or has been only partially
impaired is an enormous one. There is no litmus test for whether,
or to what extent, reservation status continues.
The Supreme Court, in Kneip, emphatically insists that "fac-
tors" relied on in previous cases-whether the tribe had agreed to
a cession or it had been unilaterally forced upon them by the Con-
gress (DeCoteau), whether the lands of the tribe in question were
purchased by the federal government for a sum certain
(Seymour)-are not "absolutes.""
The focus of our inquiry is congressional intent. This Court
has pointed in its prior decisions to factors from which intent
is inferred. The dissent erroneously seized upon several fac-
tors and present them as apparent absolutes .... This,
however, misapprehends the nature of our inquiry, which is
to inquire whether a congressional determination to ter-
minate is "expressed on the face of the Act or is clear from the
surrounding circumstances and legislative history .... '
It is for each tribe, therefore, to weigh the benefits of
establishing de jure reservation status against the costs which the
arduous task of reconstructing tribal history, interpreting a hun-
dred years of tribal relationships with the executive and legislative
branches of the federal government, and litigating the issues
hereby presented, will necessarily entail.
For instance, the Iowa Indians, in the now familiar language in
Article I of their 1891 allotment agreement, "surrender and relin-
quish" to the United States all their "right, title, claim and interest"
to their entire reservation. However, in Article V, the allotment
agreement provides:
There shall be excepted from the operation of this agreement
a tract of land, not exceeding ten acres in a square form, in-
cluding the church and schoolhouse and graveyard at or near
the Iowa village, and ten acres of land shall belong to said
133. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip. 430 U.S. 584, 590 (1977).
134. Id. at 588 n.4.
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Iowa Tribe of Indians in common so long as they shall use
the same for religious, educational, and burial purposes for
their said tribe-but whenever they shall cease to use the
same for such purposes for their tribe, said tract of land shall
belong to the United States. '
And, further, in the Supplement Articles, Article XII provides
for another ten-acre tract for tribal use. It states:
It is further agreed that when said allotments are being made,
the Chief of the Jowas may select an additional ten acres in a
square form for the use of said tribe in said reservation, con-
forming in boundaries to the legal subdivisions of land
therein, which shall be held by said tribe in common but
when abandoned by said tribe shall become the property of
the United States.
36
Applying the principles extracted from the recent Supreme
Court cases, it is apparent that Article V clearly "except[s] from
the operation" of the 1891 allotment agreement a ten-acre tract of
land constituting under the most severe construction a "dimin-
ished" reservation. Article XII of the agreement further carries this
notion forward by reserving another ten-acre tract to be selected
by the Iowa chief to be held in common by the tribe for tribal use.
On the broader question of whether the allotment agreement
unequivocally contemplated extinguishment of the original Iowa
reservation boundaries, no express language of extinguishment is
found in the body of the agreement, and Articles II, III, and XII
contain language that affirmatively suggests a continuation of
reservation status.
Article II, for instance, provides that, "Each and every member
of said Iowa Tribe of Indians shall be entitled to select and locate
upon said Reservation or tract of country eighty acres of land
which shall be allotted to such Indian in severalty." Seemingly,
Article [I's language contemplates a reservation after allotment.
Article III, in pertinent part, states that, "when all of said
allotments are made and approved, then the residue of said reser-
vation, except as hereinafter stated (Articles V and XII), shall, as
far as said Iowa Indians are concerned, become public land of the
United States." The "residue" of the reservation language coupled
with the exception out of the operation of the agreement of the
reserved tract mentioned in Article V and the other tract of tribal
land authorized under the same terms in Article XII certainly
135. Act of Feb. 18, 1891, 26 Stat. 753 (emphasis added).
136. Id.
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raises a substantial question regarding intent to disestablish the
reservation boundaries.
Article XII continues with language indicating that
simultaneously with the allotment process, the Iowa chief is
authorized to select another ten-acre tract "in said reservation,
conforming in boundaries to the legal subdivisions of land
therein," for continued tribal use. Moreover, the congressional
enactment giving statutory confirmation of the agreement states in
Section 7, "That whenever and of the lands acquired by the
agreements in this act ratified and confirmed, shall be operation of
law or proclamation of the President of the United States, be open
to settlement, they shall be disposed of to actual settlers only,
under the provision of the homestead laws."
It is generally accepted that the allotment of land within an In-
dian reservation does not for that reason alone terminate the reser-
vation boundaries. Nor does opening the reservation to settlement
by non-Indians necessarily serve to disestablish the reservation. It
can be forcefully argued that the language of the Iowa Allotment
Agreement is ambiguous on the disestablishment question and, in
fact, in applying the judicial doctrine of the Supreme Court either
continuation or diminishment of the reservation boundaries is
strongly indicated rather than termination.
It has been stated with certainty that all of the Indian tribes in
western Oklahoma are nonreservation tribes. It is clear from in-
depth research that such a hasty conclusion may not stand under
closer scrutiny with respect to all tribes in western Oklahoma. To
be sure, three decisions have been rendered holding that cession
language in the allotment agreements evidenced on the face of the
act the intent of Congress to disestablish the Kickapoo Reserva-
tion,'37 the Kiowa, Comanche and Apache Reservation,'38 and the
Cheyenne and Arapaho Reservation.'38 The question of whether
the Cheyenne and Arapaho boundaries were extinguished is cur-
rently before the federal courts.
It is clear from reviewing these cases that the courts deciding
OG&E, Tooisgah, and Ellis found disestablishment from the face
of the acts and did not go beyond the act and look to the sur-
rounding circumstances and legislative history to determine the in-
tent of Congress. In Seymour, Mattz, and DeCoteau, the Court
applied a different standard and required a positive, unambiguous
intent to disestablish or terminate the reservation boundaries
137. United States v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 318 U.S. 206 (1943)
138. Tooisgah v. United States, 186 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1950).
139. Ellis v. Page, 351 F.2d 250 (10th Cir. 1965).
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without considering other factors. A more detailed discussion of
the Tooisgah and Ellis cases will follow in the section on Indian
country jurisdiction; however, the point to be made about these
cases is that apparently the Supreme Court since Seymour and
following cases would not have found a clear and unambiguous
intent to disestablish these reservations from the face of the acts
involved without a broader inquiry.
The allotment and opening statutes affecting the existence or
nonexistencee of reservation boundaries of the Indian tribes in
western Oklahoma fall into three separate categories. First, the
most extreme situation is presented by the Act of April 21, 1904 " '
in which specific reference is made to the reservation boundaries
of the Otoe-Missouria and Ponca tribes, wherein the act states,
"That the reservation lines of the said Ponca and Otoe and
Missouria Indian reservations be, and the same are hereby,
abolished." This language has been specifically referred to in
Seymour and Mattz as the kind of clear expression of intent re-
quired to find disestablishment of the reservation boundaries on
the face of the act. Second, the language found in the agreement
between the Iowa, Sac and Fox, Kiowa, Comanche and Apache,
and Kaw tribes reflects no reference to the reservation boundaries
whatsoever, but contain a cession, i.e., "hereby surrender and
relinquish to the United States all their right, title, claim and in-
terest cf every kind and character." As no reference is made to the
reservation boundaries in this last category of agreements and
because this language is typical language used to transfer
possessory rights while not necessarily involving a change of
jurisdiction, it appears an ambiguity does exist.
The point of this discussion quite simply is to point out that
without a judicial determination consistent with the Supreme
Court's standards for finding disestablishment, to conclude glibly
that the reservation boundaries of all Indian tribes in western
Oklahcma have been extinguished is an expression of faith in a
shaky legal conclusion.
It is also clear that any change in the contemporary notions
regarding the reservation status of Indian tribes in western
Oklahoma will likely require litigation. However, with respect to
these tribes in the second category in which specific tracts were
reserved out of the cession, there is a strong possibility that the
Department of the Interior might change its position by ad-
ministrative fiat and find that the reservations were diminished
rather than disestablished.
140. 33 Stat. 189.
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Definition of Section 1151(b) Jurisdiction
The initial employment of the phrase "dependent Indian com-
munity," which was to be incorporated in Section 1151 of Title 18,
appears to have occurred in the case of United States v.
Sandoval."' According to Mr. Justice Devanter:
Not only does the constitution expressly authorize Congress
to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, but long con-
tinued legislative and executive usage and an unbroken cur-
rent of judicial decisions have attributed to the United States
as a superior and civilized nation the power and the duty of
exercising care and protection over all dependent Indian
communities. "2
The Supreme Court in Sandoval does deal with New Mexico's
argument that federal power over Indians could not be made to in-
clude the lands of the Pueblos, because the Indians held their land
in fee simple:
It is true that the Indians of each pueblo do have such a title
to all lands connected therewith, excepting such as are oc-
cupied under executive orders, but it is a communal title, no
individual owning any separate tract. In other words, the
lands are public lands of the pueblo, and so the situation is
essentially the same as it was with the Five Civilized Tribes,
whose lands, although owned in fee under patents from the
United States were adjudged subject to the legislature of the
Congress.'
The key, however, to determining whether the settlement of the
Indians in question constitutes a "dependent Indian community,"
"Indian country" subject to federal jurisdiction, is not the status of
the land upon which it is situated, but the manner in which they
have been treated by the executive and legislative branches of the
federal government. Thus, the Court, in Sandoval, concludes that
the Pueblos are "dependent Indian communities" because
they have been regarded and treated by the United States as
requiring special consideration and protection, like other In-
dian communities. These public moneys have been expended
in presenting them with farming implements and utensils,
and in their civilization and instruction, agents and
superintendents have been provided to guard their interests,
141. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
142. Id. at 45.
143. Id. at 48.
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central training schools and day schools at the pueblos have
been established .... "
A settlement of Indians is a "dependent Indian community,"
then, if Congress and the executive branch decide it should be one.
The Court makes it clear that, "lilt is not meant by this that Con-
gress may bring a community or body of people within the range
of this [its] power by arbitrarily calling them an Indian tribe."'45
Still, "in respect of distinctly Indian communities the questions
whether, to what extent, and for what time they shall be recog-
nized and dealt with as dependent tribes requiring the guardian-
ship and protection of the United States are to be determined by
the Congress, and not by the courts.
1 6
In 1938, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether
the Reno Colony of Indians, clearly not a "reservation," was "In-
dian country." Mr. Justice Beach, speaking for the Court, stated:
The fundamental consideration of both Congress and the
Department of the Interior in establishing this colony has
been the protection of a dependent people. Indians in this col-
ony have been afforded the same protection by the govern-
ment as that given Indians in other settlements known as
"reservations." Congress alone has the right to determine the
manner in which this country's guardianship over the Indians
shall be carried out, and it is immaterial whether Congress
designates a settlement as a "reservation or a colony.....
The fact that the federal government retained title to the lands
of the Reno Colony, again, clearly is not crucial. What is impor-
tant is the "relationship which has long existed between the
Government and the Indians and which continues to date,"'45 that
the land "is under the superintendence of the Government."
It is important to take note, here, of the fact that United States
v. McGowan explicitly follows United States v. Sandoval and
that United States v. McGowan provided, according to the re-
vised notes in Section 1151, the basis for Section 1151(b).
The contention that Section 1151(b) may be read to include
within the term "Indian country" Indian settlements whose
dependency on federal support has been recognized by the federal
government, regardless of the status of their lands, has received
the support of the Tenth Circuit.
144. Id. at 39, 40.
145. Id. at 46.
146. Id.
147. United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 538 (1938), rev'g 89 F.2d 201 (9th Cir.
1937), a/f'gUnited States v. One Chevrolet Sedan, 16 F. Supp. 453 (D. Nev. 1936).
148. Id.
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In United States v. Martine,'49 the state of New Mexico argued
that it has jurisdiction over a Navajo charged with the involuntary
manslaughter of another Navajo within what was known as "the
checkerboard area," "a patchwork of land, some of which is owned
by the Navajo Tribe, some of which is not." It was clear, said the
court, that, "The particular place where the accident took place
was neither on an Indian reservation nor on an allotment. It was
in an area known as the Ramah community on land owned by the
Navajo Tribe, it having been purchased with tribal funds from a
corporate owner. '
The court in Martine explicitly follows United States v. San-
doval, in which decision the Supreme Court "looked to the man-
ner in which the pueblos had been treated by legislative and ex-
ecutive agencies and concluded that the pueblos were dependent
Indian communities."
After reviewing Sandoval, says the Court, it is convinced that
the proper approach to the problem of what is or is not a "depen-
dent Indian community" was followed by the trial court below:
The trial court received evidence as to the nature of the area
in question, the relationship of the inhabitants of the area to
Indian tribes and to the federal government, and the
established practice of government agencies toward the area.
The testimony of enforcement officers and Bureau of Indian
Affairs officials support the trial court's holding that the situs
of this accident was Indian country.' 2
But, argues the appellant, if "Indian country is to include land
that is neither Indian reservation, nor trust, nor allotment and
held under federal restriction," does not the holding imply "that
wherever a group of Indians is found, e.g., in Los Angeles, there is
a dependent Indian community?" The court says it will not go that
far: "The test we are applying here is not so simple. Only after
considering all of the various factors we have noted, as well as any
other relevant factors, can the trial court determine the status of a
particular area. The mere presence of a group of Indians in a par-
ticular area would undoubtedly not suffice."' 3
Application of Section 1151(b) Jurisdiction to Western Oklahoma
All the Indian tribes in western Oklahoma own land within
149. 442 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir. 1971).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1023.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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their original boundaries to which federal and tribal jurisdiction
would attach under Section 1151(b). The tribal character of the
ownership meets the tests relating to use and occupancy of the
property, in addition to satisfying any requirement that the entity
or "community" have a history of distinctive Indian treatment and
eligibility for federal benefits as distinguished from instances
wherein a number of Indians live in proximity.
These tribal lands are ordinarily the center of tribal governmen-
tal activity. The tribal headquarters, tribal community buildings,
and other facilities are ordinarily located on tribal lands. The
balance of tribal land is reserved for and put to tribal economic
endeavors.
Finally, the various Indian tribal communities in western
Oklahoma constitute dependent Indian communities within the
meaning of this statute because of a long-standing, uninterrupted
trustee relationship with a defined legal status vis-a-vis the United
States clearly beyond any occasional relationship such as that
mentioned in United States v. Martine, distinguishing a true
dependent Indian community from "a group of Indians living in
Los Angeles." For instance, the Absentee Shawnee community is a
distinctly Indian community dependent upon the United States for
the continuation of its tribal status, and is presently under the
superintendence of fhe federal government. Therefore, the oc-
cupation and use of this tribal community of its tribal lands render
these lands Indian country for tribal and federal jurisdictional pur-
poses.
Definition of Section 1151(c) Jurisdiction
In 1948 even Congress realized that the definition of Indian
country set forth in Section 1151(a) of Title 18 would not en-
compass those trust allotments on the public domain in the opened
areas of what had theretofore been reservations."' As a result, Sec-
tion 1151(c) was set forth as an addition to the definition of Indian
country: "(c) All Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have
not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through
the same."
Logically enough, to support the continuation of these
allotments as Indian country, the decision of the Supreme Court
which held that allotments on the public domain in the opened
areas of what had theretofore been reservations should continue
to be subject to federal jurisdiction was cited: "Indian allotments
were included in the definition on authority of the case of United
States v. Pelican." [Citation omitted.]
154. H.R. REP., 80th Cong., 2d Sess., Reviser's Note, 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1948).
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In Pelican the Court held that federal jurisdiction was not ex-
tinguished merely because the trust allotment had been left behind
on the public domain when the boundaries of a reservation were
receded after the opening of that reservation. Specifically, the
Court in Pelican was involved with the 1892 opening of the Col-
ville Reservation which disestablished approximately one-half of
the Colville Reservation. To this extent, Section 1151(c) specifical-
ly approved and provided for the impractical pattern of checker-
board jurisdiction. Some provision had to be made for the open-
ing that left behind trust allotments situated on the public domain
outside the boundaries of a reservation. It appears that this provi-
sion was specifically tailored to fit precisely the situation
presented by the Sisseton-Wahpeton 'opening addressed in
DeCoteau.
Thus, Section 1151(c) does not operate as a restriction on clause
(a) but carries a force of its own:
Clause (c) came into the statute as the result of the holding in
United States v. Pelican, [citation omitted] namely, that
lands allotted to Indians remained within the definition of In-
dian country even though the rest of the reservation was
opened to settlement .... Clause (c) is an addition to and not
a limitation upon the definition of Indian country embraced
in the preceding portions of § 1151. We regard (c) as applying
to allotted Indian lands in territory now open and not as
something which restricts the plain meaning of clause (a)'s
phrase "notwithstanding the issuance of any patent".
Although this result tends to produce some checkerboarding
in non-reservation land, it is temporary and lasts only until
the Indian title is extinguished. The congressional purpose
and intent seems to be clear. 5
The jurisdictional status of Indian trust and restricted allotments
has long been a matter of judicial scrutiny. The cases of United
States v. Pelican,"' United States v. Ramsey,' 7 DeCoteau v.
District County Court,58 Ex parte Van Moore,' In re Carmen,"
and United States ex rel. Cook v. Parkinson,"' are all cases con-
sidering the character of Indian allotments outside the limits of
continuing Indian reservations. These cases uniformly hold that
155. Beardslee v. United States, 387 F.2d 280, 287 (8th Cir. 1967).
156. 232 U.S. 442 (1914).
157. 271 U.S. 467 (1926).
158. 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
159. 221 F. 954 (1915).
160. 165 F. Supp. 942, a£f'd270 F.2d 809 (1958).
161. 306 F. Supp. 473 (1975).
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Indian trust allotments, even though not within the boundaries of
an Indian reservation, retain distinctively Indian character during
the trust period because they are devoted to Indian occupancy
under the limitations imposed by federal legislation. In addition,
at least two Oklahoma decisions, Ex parte Nowabbi,'62 and Ex
parte Wallace,6 3 conclude that trust allotments are Indian country
within the meaning of the statutes reserving exclusive jurisdiction
to the United States.
In Pelican, the defendants Sam Pelican and Tony Ponterre were
indicted for the murder of Ed Louie, a fullblood Indian and a
member of the Colville Tribe. The murder took place upon the
allotment of Agnes, a Colville Indian, which was held in trust for
her by the United States. The allotment was made pursuant to the
General Allotment Act of 1887 within an area ceded to the United
States by the Colville Tribe and restored to the public domain.
The Court stated:
It cannot be doubted that the power of Congress was quite as
complete to punish crimes committed by or against Indians
upon allotted lands of this character as to prohibit the in-
troduction of liquor. The present question, then, is not one of
power, but whether it can be said that the descriptive term
"Indian country", as it is used in 2145 of the Revised Statutes,
is inadequate to embrace these allotments or, if it is adequate
for that purpose, whether Congress, in providing for the
allotments has excluded them from the purview of that
statute.
We find no inadequacy in the statutory description. The
lands, which, prior to the allotment, undoubtedly formed
part of the Indian country, still retain during the trust period
a distinctively Indian character, being devoted to Indian oc-
cupancy under the limitations imposed by federal legisla-
tion.'64
In discussing Section 6 of the general Allotment Act of 1887, '
the Pelican Court stated:
It is true that by § 6 of the act of 1887, it was provided that
upon the completion of the allotments and the patenting of
the land to the allottees under that act, every allottee should
"have the benefit of and be subject to the laws, both civil and
162. 60 Okla. Cr. 111, 61 P.2d 1139 (1936).
163. 81 Okla. Cr. 176, 162 P.2d 205 (1945).
164. United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442, 448-49 (1914).
165. Now codified at 25 U.S.C. § 349, asnamended(1970).
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criminal, of the state or territory" in which he resided. [Cita-
tion omitted.] But, by the act of May 8, 1906, chap. 2348 (34
Stat. at L. 182), Congress amended this section so as distinct-
ly to postpone to the expriation of the trust period the subjec-
tion of allottees under that act to state laws. The first part of
the section, as amended, is: "That at the expiration of the
trust period, and when the lands have been conveyed to the
Indians by patent in fee, as provided in § 5 of this act, then
each and every allottee shall have the benefit of and be sub-
ject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or Ter-
ritory in which they reside." And, at the same time, there was
added to the section of the explicit pro-viso: "That until the is-
suance of fee-simple patents all allottees to whom trust
patents shall hereafter be issued shall be subject to the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the United States." We deem it to be
clear that Congress had the power thus to continue the guar-
dianship of the government. [Citation omitted.] ... And
these provisions leave no room for doubt as to the intent of
Congress with respect to the maintenance of the Federal
jurisdiction over the allotted lands described in the indict-
ment."
In United States v. Ramsey,'67 two white men were charged with
the murder of Henry Roan, a fullblood Osage Indian and member
of the Osage Tribe, which took place upon a restricted, not a
trust, surplus allotment. Ramsey is a case that arose in the
Western District of Oklahoma, and involves the infamous Osage
murders of the 1920's. Significantly, the United States Supreme
Court in Ramsey held that the authority of the United States to
punish crimes committed by or against Indians in Indian country
continued unaltered after the admission of Oklahoma as a state.
On the issue of the restricted allotment as Indian country, the
Court stated:
The sole question of our determination, therefore, is whether
the place of the crime is Indian country, within the meaning
of § 2145. The place is a tract of land constituting an Indian
allotment, carved out of the Osage Indian reservation and
conveyed in fee to the allottee named in the indictment, sub-
ject to a restriction against alienation for a period of 25 years.
That period has not elapsed, nor has the allottee ever receiv-
ed a certificate of competency authorizing her to sell. As
166. United States v. Pelican, 232U.S. 442 (1914).
167. 271 U.S. 467 (1926).
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pointed out in United States v. Bowling [Citation Om-
mitted], there are two modes by which Indians are prevented
from improvidently disposing of their allotments. One is by
means of a certificate, called a trust patent, by the terms of
which the Government holds the land for a period of years in
trust for the allottee with an agreement to convey at the end
of the trust period. The other mode is to issue a patent con-
veying to the allottee the land in fee but prohibiting its aliena-
tion for a stated period. Both have the same effect so far as
the power of alienation is concerned, but one is commonly
called a trust allotment and the other a restricted allotment.
The judgment of the court below turns upon this narrow dif-
ference. l'
The Court set forth its reasoning as follows:
The essential identity of the two kinds of allotments-so far
as the question here under consideration may be af-
fected-was recognized in the Bowling case, where it was
said (p. 487) that in one class as much as the other "the
United States possesses a supervisory control over the land
and may take appropriate measures to make sure that it in-
ures to the sole use and benefit of the allottee and his heirs
throughout the original or any extended period of restric-
tion." In practical effect, trust or the restricted period, is the
same. Since Congress possesses the broad power of
legislating for the protection of the Indians wherever they
may be within the territory of the United States, the question
presented is not one of power but wholly one of statutory
construction. Viewed from that premise, it would be quite
unreasonable to attribute to Congress an intention to extend
the protection of the criminal law to an Indian upon a trust
allotment and withhold it from one upon a restricted allot-
ment; and we find nothing in the nature of the subject matter
or in the words of the statute which would justify us in apply-
ing the term Indian country to one and not to the other.'6'
In a widely accepted treatise on federal Indian law, the Ramsey
case is discussed as follows:
Thereafter in United States v. Ramsey, Indian country was
held to include a restricted allotment as well .... Thus, the
application of federal criminal law was held to cover lands to
168. Id. at 470.
169. ld. at 471-72.
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which the tribal title has been extinguished and title has been
vested in an individual.' 0
In the Ramsey case, the Court makes the determination that
regardless of whether title is vested in the tribe or is vested in the
individual Indian, thereby extinguishing tribal title, "Indian title"
is not extinguished. This determination is of major importance in
determining the meaning of "Indian titles to which have not been
extinguished" language of Section 1151(c).
Ex parte Van Moore, '' involving a trust allotment wholly out-
side the boundaries of an Indian reservation, is in accord with
Pelican and Ramsey and adds to the significant weight of authori-
ty favoring the legal notion that all Indian trust and restricted
allotments are clearly Indian country within the meaning of Sec-
tion 1151(c).
In re Carmen" represents a further well-grounded judicial ex-
tension of the definition of Indian allotments as Indian country.
The trust allotment in question in this case was not carved out of a
former Indian reservation but was made pursuant to the General
Allotment Act of 1887 upon the public domain. Carmen held that
an Indian allotment, title to which is still in trust, is within the
definition of "Indian country," regardless of whether allotment
was made from lands in the public domain or from land of which
Indians have had uninterrupted use and occupancy, and, as such,
is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. The state,
to no avail, contended that only allotments included within the
definition of Section 1151(c) were those in which the allotment
was made from lands within or formerly within an Indian reserva-
tion or from land of which the Indians have had uninterrupted use
and occupancy. The court, in discussing the legislative history of
Section 1151, observed:
Section 1151 represents the first attempt to statutorily define
the term "Indian country" since the Act of June 30, 1834, 4
Stat. 729, which had been repealed in 1874 (Revised Statutes
§ 5596). Section 1151 resulted from the judicial definitions of
the term in the intervening years. House Report No. 304,
80th Congress, page 492 states that Indian allotments were
included in the definition of Indian country on the authority
of United States v. Pelican. In Pelican a murder had been
committed on an Indian allotment which had been carved
170. COHEN, supra note 15, at 8.
171. Exparte Van Moore, 221 F. 954 (D.S.D. 1915).
172. 165 F. Supp. 942, aff'd270 F.2d 809 (1958).
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out of an Indian reservation and then excluded from the
boundaries of the reservation. The Supreme Court held that
so long as the United States held title to the allotment in trust
for the Indian allottee it remained Indian country even
though the allotment was no longer within the reservation.
Respondent interprets the Pelican decision to mean that an
allotment to be Indian country must have been made from
lands which were previously Indian country. But this is an
unduly restricted view of that decision. In Pelican the allot-
rnent in question had in fact been made from lands that were
already Indian country. But, that decision does not imply at
all that this was a necessary prerequisite to the allotment be-
ing Indian country. Indeed, quite the contrary is true. In
Pelican, the reservation from which the allotment was made
had itself been created out of the public domain rather than
from land which had previously been in Indian possession.
The Supreme Court noted that in an earlier decision,
Donnelly v. United States, it had held that a reservation set
apart out of the public domain was just as truly Indian coun-
try as a reservation created from land which had always been
occupied by Indians. The court then went on to say that: "In
the present case, the original reservation was Indian country
simply because it had been validly set apart for the use of the
Indians as such, under the superintendence of the govern-
ment .... The same considerations, in substance, apply to
the allotted lands which, when the reservation was dimin-
ished, were excepted from the portion restored to the public
domain. The allottees were permitted to enjoy a more secure
tenure, and provision was made for their ultimate ownership
without restrictions. But, meanwhile, the lands remained In-
clian lands set apart for Indians under governmental care;
and we are unable to find ground for the conclusion that they
became other than Indian country through the distribution
into separate holdings, the government retaining control."
[Citations omitted. ],73
The Carmen court noted the proper interpretation of the title
required to come within the purview of Section 1151(c), stating:
Since all Indian allotments, regardless of their source, are
maintained under the same type of governmental supervi-
sion, either by holding title in trust for the allottee or by
173. Id.
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restricting alienation, there is no logical reason for making
the application of protective criminal statutes dependent
upon the source of the allotment. But, if there were otherwise
any doubt about the matter, there is an aspect of the
legislative history of Section 1151, overlooked by respon-
dent, which compels the conclusion that the Congress intend-
ed to include in this statutory definition of Indian country all
Indian allotments, regardless of source, while in trust or in-
alienable by the allottee. Prior to 1948 when Section 1151
was enacted, Section 241 of Title 25 of the United States
Code made it a criminal offense to introduce intoxicating li-
quor into the Indian country and provided that such term
should include "any Indian allotment while the title to the
same shall be held in trust by the Government, or while the
same shall remain inalienable by the allottee without the con-
sent of the United States." 52 Stat. 969. In 1948, Section 241
was repealed and the prohibition against introducing intox-
icating liquor into the Indian country was incorporated in
new Section 1154 of Title 18. But, the provision of the repealed
Section 241 that Indian country should include "any Indian
allotment while the title to the same shall be held in trust by
the Government, or while the same shall remain inalienable
by the allottee without the consent of the United States" was
omitted from the new Section 1154. The Reviser's Note
specifically states this portion of repealed section 241"relating
to the scope of the term 'Indian country' was omitted as un-
necessary in view of the definitions of 'Indian country' in Sec-
tion 1151" of Title 18. It is thus clear that when Congress pro-
vided in Section 1151 that Indian country should include "all
Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been
extinguished," it considered this description broad enough to
encompass all Indian allotments while the title to the same
shall be held in trust by the Government, or while the same
shall remain inalienable by the allottee without the consent of
the United States. The allotment which was the situs of peti-
tioner's offense is then Indian country within the meaning of
the Ten Major Crimes Act. 74
Clearly, the allotments in western Oklahoma possess a greater
legal character and dignity as Indian country than the public do-
main land in Carmen in that these Oklahoma allotments are carved
out of the communal tribal estate and have been devoted to ex-
clusive and uninterrupted Indian use and occupancy.
174. Id. at 946.
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Application of Section 1151(c) Jurisdiction to Western Oklahoma
Section 1151(c) provides that Indian country means "all Indian
allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished,
including rights-of-way through the same." Although the statute is
clear, case law arising from criminal cases in Oklahoma regarding
Indian country jurisdiction has been in disarray. This need not be
so. The cause of this disarray appears to be the confusing set of
headnotes attached to the easily misunderstood opinion of Judge
Murrah in Tooisgah v. United States.'3
Tooisgah v. United States (hereafter referred to as Tooisgah I)
is an important decision not only by reason of what it stands for,
but also for what it does not stand for as authority in considering
the Indian country character of Indian trust allotments in western
Oklahoma.
On June 2, 1942, Phillip Tooisgah, an Apache Indian, murdered
Lucy Tahdooahnippah, a Comanche Indian, in Caddo County,
Oklahoma, on the Indian trust allotment of Ellen Mulkehay, an
Apache Indian. The Mulkehay allotment was carved from the
Kiowa, Comanche and Apache Indian reservation, and title to the
allotment was held in trust for her by the United States. In
Tooisgah I, he was tried, convicted, and sentenced to life im-
prisonment; his appeal through the Tenth Circuit was completed
in 1943. Federal jurisdiction over the offense was based upon the
allegation in the indictment that the homicide occurred in Indian
country upon a reservation and a tract of land within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States, and under the applicable federal
law in existence in 1942 (Rev. Stat. § 2145, 25 U.S.C. § 217, and 18
U.S.C. § 548) defining Indian country and the applicability of the
Ten Major Crimes Act.
Tooisgah, seven years after his conviction and sentence, moved
to vacate his judgment and sentence for reason that the federal
court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence.
In this second case, the appellant, Tooisgah, set forth his argu-
ment, stating:
Appellant urges a decisive distinction between allotted lands
excepted or reserved from a reservation restored to the public
domain as in the Pelican case, or a restricted allotment in the
Osage Reservation as in the Ramsey case, and an allotment
from lands, the Indian title to which had been extinguished
before or subject to allotment .... It is argued with reason,
175. 186 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1950) [hereinafter referred to as Tooisgah I1].
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that with the extinguishment of Indian title to all of the lands
in the reservation, it no longer retained its Indian character,
and therefore ceased to be Indian country within the meaning
of Section 2145 (Section 217), and certainly not a reservation
within the purview of Section 548.76
In other words, Tooisgah urged the court to find not only that
the trust allotments in question were not Indian country as then
defined but also that the Indian character of these allotments had
been totally extinguished. Although Tooisgah II has been cited as
authority for such a strained and artificial interpretation, this
question was not decided in the case. On this issue, the Tooisgah
court, speaking through Judge Murrah, stated:
We find it unnecessary to decide whether the trust allotments
in question might have been construed as "Indian country"
under 217 or 548 when the offense was committed, since we
are convinced that Congress did not intend to use the terms
"Indian country" and "within the limits of any ... reser-
vation" synonymously when it came to relax the limitations
imposed upon 217 or 218. When the legislative scheme is con-
sidered in its historical setting, we think it of controlling
significance that instead of employing the familiar term "In-
dian country", with its broad and flexible definition to
delineate federal jurisdiction, Congress chose language
carefully designed to recognize the sovereign jurisdiction of a
state, unless the offense was committed on a place set apart
for the government of the Indians as a tribe. The deliberate
choice of the phrase "within any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States Government" indicates, we
think, a Congressional disposition to restrict federal jurisdic-
tion to organized reservations lying within a state.
In the reenactment of 548 as Section 1153, Title 18 USCA,
Congress substituted "Indian country" for "on (or) within
any Indian reservation", thus conferring federal jurisdiction
over the enumerated crimes when committed in Indian coun-
try, as defined in Section 1151 of the Revised Criminal Code.
But, judging federal jurisdiction here under the words of
the statute when the offense was committed, we are now con-
strained to hold that when the reservation was dissolved and
tribal government broken up, the allotted lands lost their
character as lands "within any Indian reservation' Nor did
176. Id. at 98.
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they retain or acquire a character and identity peculiar to a
separate Indian reservation. We therefore hold that the court
lacked jurisdiction over the offense."'
The issue of whether trust allotments are or are not Indian coun-
try was not decided in Tooisgah II. Tooisgah I, in essence, is a
disestablishment case holding that the Agreement of October 21,
1892, approved June 6, 1900,78 and commonly referred to as the
Jerome Agreement, disestablished the Kiowa, Comanche and
Apache Indian reservation, and therefore the Mulkehay allot-
ment, not being within the boundaries of an Indian reservation,
was not lands "within any Indian reservation." And, it held, quite
simply, that an Indian allotment, the Mulkehay allotment, was
not an Indian reservation.
Tooisgah IIis not a case of general applicability. It is limited to
its facts by its unique application of an already superseded stan-
dard. In fact, Tooisgah 11 represented the law of the past on the
day the decision was rendered in 1950. Judge Murrah did not app-
ly current law to the second Tooisgah case. He applied the law of
1942 in 1950 "judging federal jurisdiction here under the words of
the statute when the offense was committed." The statutory law of
1942 had been dramatically changed in 1948 when the Congress
enacted a statutory definition of Indian country specifically in-
cluding all Indian allotments in the definition of Indian country.
Employing the analytical method previously suggested, we find
(1) that the cause of action arose on June 2, 1942; (2) that both the
alleged victim and the alleged offender are Indians; (3) that the
statutes in effect at the time the cause of action arose are Rev. Stat.
§ 2145 (25 U.S.C. § 217), Rev. Stat. § 2146 (25 U.S.C. § 218), and
23 Stat. 385 (all set out verbatim, supra); (4) that the land upon
which the cause of action arose was an Indian allotment, legal title
to which was still held in trust by the United States.
With these findings in mind, Judge Murrah's reasoning is easy to
follow:
First, because both the alleged victim and the alleged offender
are Indian, Rev. Stat. § 2145 (25 U.S.C. § 217), as limited by Rev.
Stat. § 2146 (25 U.S.C. § 218), do not provide a basis for federal
jurisdiction:
Under R.S. § 2145 (25 U.S.C.A. § 217), the general laws of
the United States as to the punishment of crimes committed
any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the
177. Id. at 99 (emphasis added).
178. 31 Stat. 676, 681.
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United States was extended to "Indian country". But the
following Section 2146, (25 U.S.C.A. § 218), expressly pro-
vides in material part that Section 2145 should not extend to
crimes by one Indian against the person or property of
another Indian.
Murrah concludes quite properly, therefore, that "the only ques-
tion for decision is whether the asserted federal jurisdiction over
the offense is sustainable under § 328 [the Major Crimes Act] as an
offense of murder of one Indian by another on and within any In-
dian reservation under the Jurisdiction of the United States
Government."''
Second, Judge Murrah decides that, by agreement with the
United States government, the Kiowa, Comanche and Apache
reservation was disestablished. If this is the case, writes Murrah:
"The inquiry then is whether these several allotments, into which
the reservation was divided, nevertheless remained 'within any
reservation: or in some manner became separate reservations for
purposes of federal jurisdiction under Section 328'.""' He con-
cludes that they did not:
[Wie are convinced that Congress did not intend to use the
terms "indian country" and "within the limits of any
... reservation" synonymously when it came to relax the
limitations imposed upon 217 or 218. When the legislative
scheme is considered in its historical setting, we think it of
controlling significance that instead of employing the
familiar term "indian country", with its broad and flexible
definition to delineate federal jurisdiction, Congress chose
language carefully designed to recognize the sovereign
jurisdiction of a state, unless the offense was committed on a
place set apart for the government of the Indians as a tribe.
The deliberate choice of the phrase "within any Indian reser-
vation under the jurisdiction of the United States Govern-
ment" indicates, we think, a Congressional disposition to
restrict federal jurisdiction to organize reservations lying
within a state.'81
And third, if they are no longer lands "within any Indian reser-
vation," Murrah holds, logically enough, "that the court lacked
jurisdiction over the offense.'""'
179. Id. at 96.
180. Id. at 98.
181. Id. at 99.
182. Id.
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It must be noted that the phrase "on and within any Indian
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Govern-
ment," referred to by Murrah, was taken from 23 Stat. 385, and
not from the statutory successor 18 U.S.C. § 1153, and that the
phrase Murrah construed has been entirely deleted from Section
1153 and the phrase "within Indian country"substituted therefor.
There can be no doubt that under present federal law, as Mur-
rah himself points out, the decision in Tooisgah would be precise-
ly the reverse:
In the reenactment of 548 as Section 1153, Title 18 USCA,
Congress substituted "Indian country" for on (or) within any
Indian reservation, thus conferring federal jurisdiction over
the enumerated crimes when in Indian country, as defined in
Section 1151 of the Revised Criminal Code.
But, judging federal jurisdiction here under the words of
the statute when the offense was committed we are now con-
strained to hold that where the reservation was dis-
solved... the allotted lands lost their character as Indian
reservations."13
Murrah understood the definition of "Indian country." He knew
that the Supreme Court, in United States v. Pelican, had deter-
mined that the term included "all Indian allotments, the Indian
titles to which have not been extinguished." He was aware of the
fact that the result in Pelican had been codified in Section 1151(c)
of Title 18: "Trust allotments reserved or excepted from a portion
of an Indian reservation restored to the public domain was held to
retain its character as Indian country ....
Murrah had merely construed the statute in effect at the time the
offense before him had been committed, and the touchstone of
federal jurisdiction established by that statute was not "Indian
country" but "Indian reservation." How very unfortunate, then,
that such a well reasoned and lucid exposition should be confused
by the headnotes attached to it:
(1) The term "Indian country" was used in the statute defin-
ing that term and the term "within the limits of any reserva-
tion" are not synonymous. 18 USCA § 1151. (2) The
deliberate choice of the phrase "within any Indian reserva-
tion under the jurisdiction of the United States Government"
by Congress in defining the term "Indian country" indicated
183. Id. (emphasis added).
184. Id. at 98.
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a congressional disposition to restrict federal jurisdiction to
organized reservations lying within a state. 18 USCA § 1151
(emphasis added). (3) Where lands where full-blooded Indian
allegedly murdered full-blooded Indian had originally been
part of an Indian reservation, but Indians had ceded the lands
to the United States subject to allotment in severalty to in-
dividual members of tribes, the lands lost their character as
lands within meaning of statute defining Indian country, and
therefore federal District Court had no jurisdiction of murder
prosecution. 18 USCA § 1151."'
It might seem needlessly repetitious to point out (1) that the
phrase "within the limits of any reservation" to which Murrah
referred appeared not in 18 U.S.C. § 1151, but in 23 Stat. 385, a
statute no longer in effect, and that the wording in Section 1153
had been made to include the larger concept of "Indian country";
(2) that whether a "congressional disposition to restrict federal
jurisdiction over major crimes fo organized.reservations lying
within a state" is indicated by the wording of 23 Stat. 385, such a
disposition is no longer even arguably in evidence given the new
language in Section 1153; (3) that while a determination that In-
dian lands "lost their character as lands 'within an Indian reserva-
tion' might have meant that under 23 Stat. 385, a federal district
court would have no jurisdiction over a prosecution of one Indian
for the murder of another, it can no longer have such import
under the revised wording of Sections 1151 and 1153.
Again, it might seem needlessly repetitious to point out that
despite the import of the headnotes, Judge Murrah construed not
the meaning of Sections 1151 and 1153, but of Revised Statutes
Sections 2145 and 2146 and 23 Stat. 385. It might, were it not for
the progeny the headnotes in Tooisgah I!appear to have sired.
Tooisgah HI, therefore, is not authority in a Section 1151(c)
case. Nor are other decisions that tie their validity to Tooisgah ,
such as Application of Yates" and Ellis v. State,'7 authority in the
present inquiry because Tooisgah I1 considered law no longer in
force.
In Application of Yates, the petitioner, Eugene Yates, sought his
release from the Oklahoma State Penitentiary in a habeas corpus
action in which he asserted that the crime he was convicted of was
committed in "Indian country" against a person of Indian blood
185. Id. at 94.
186. 349 P.2d 45 (Okla. Cr. 1960).
187. 386 P.2d 326 (Okla. Cr. 1963).
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and under the provision of Article I, Section 3 of the Oklahoma
constitution and Sections 1151, 1152, and 1153 of Title 18, the
state of Oklahoma was without authority to try and convict him
of said crime. The petitioner relied upon In re Carmen,'8 a case in-
volving jurisdiction over a trust allotment and clearly construing
Section 1151(c). The court cited Tooisgah II as contrary to the
Carmen decision and extensively quoted from the text of the
Tooisgah opinion. However, the merits were not reached in
Application of Yates, and the holding appears to be a narrow pro-
cedural finding that the petition was insufficient to bring the peti-
tioner within the ambit of the judicial and statutory authority he
sought to rely upon. The court stated: "It is not necessary that we
reconcile these opinions, since the allegations of the petition are
not sufficient to bring the petitioner within the purview of these
statu:es and adjudicated cases .... ""
Indicating its adherence to Tooisgah, the court continued:
It is well to observe, however, that even if he is a fullblood
[ndian as defined by the statute, which he does not allege,
under the authority of Tooisgah v. United States, supra, he
would not be entitled to relief herein by habeas corpus. This
necessarily follows since we feel we are bound by the authori-
ty of the Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit.'
Aside from the inappropriate reliance upon Tooisgah, the peti-
tioner, to his detriment, prepared and filed his petition for habeas
corpus without the services of an attorney. A decision in which
the moving party is pro se, and the state's interests are represented
by an attorney, at best, is questionable authority. Judge Brett,
writing for the court in Yates, finds Tooisgah II to have involved
"similar facts" and to be "to the contrary" of Carmen.'"' As
evidence of the "contrary" holding in Tooisgah, Judge Brett ac-
tually quotes not from the text of Murrah's decision, but from the
attached headnotes. The court continues and thereby cites, as
somehow relevant, conflicts between the language of two statutes
which no longer exist. The reason it eluded the court appears ob-
vious. The citations contained in the misleading headnotes appear
to relate the decision to an existing statute, Section 1151 of Title 18
of the United States Code. It seems clear that the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma stood ready to compound the er-
188. 165 F. Supp. 942, a~f'd 270 F.2d 809 (1958).




ror it had made in Application of Yates when it decided the case of
Ellis v. State.92
In Ellis v. State, a procedural problem was also present in that
Ellis had not raised the jurisdictional question at the trial level.
Furthermore, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Ellis alleged
that the offense "occurred on a county road, known as the Old
Mill Road, approximately a mile south of the city limits of Clin-
ton, in Custer County, and is within limits of the Cheyenne and
Arapaho Indian Reservation." That "Indian reservation as used in
the several acts of Congress means 'Indian Country' as defined in
18 USCA Sec. 1151." Ellis' petition is drawn with imprecision and
does not designate whether he relies on part (a), (b), or (c).
However, the petition is drawn principally to meet the definitional
language of Section 1151(a), which provides: "(a) all land within
the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States government notwithstanding the issuance of any pa-
tent, and, including rights-of-way running through the
reservation .... " There was no allegation in the petition covering
the dependent community language in Section 1151(b), and, more
importantly, in terms of the present inquiry, Ellis' petition con-
tained no allegation that the locus in quo of the offense was an In-
dian allotment as defined in Section 1151(c).
To further amplify on the absence of the Section 1151(c) ques-
tion from the Ellis case, Ellis relied on Seymour v. Schneckloth,"'
which is the case turning on the question of whether the Colville
Indian Reservation itself was disestablished or dissolved. The of-
fense, burglary, occurred upon property held under a patent in fee
located in the town of Omak, Washington. The property of the
Colville Tribe was part of the surplus lands opened to settlement
under the homestead laws and was not then and had never been an
Indian allotment. The lower courts held that although the land
upon which the offense occurred had once been within the limits
of an Indian reservation, that reservation had since been dissolved
and the land in question restored to the public domain. The United
States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the land on which the
offense was committed had not lost its status as an Indian reserva-
tion, and for that reason, it was immaterial that the particular
parcel of land in question was held under a patent in fee by a non-
Indian and was located in a town. Moreover, the habeas corpus
petition in Seymour did not allege that the situs of the offense was
on a trust allotment nor did it designate a particular clause of Sec-
192. 386 P.2d 326 (Okla. Cr. 1963).
193. 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
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tion 1.151, as Ellis did not. Therefore, the question of jurisdiction
over a trust allotment as Indian country within the meaning of
Section 1151(c) was not before the court and the holding in Ellis is
clearly limited to construing Section 1151(a), the Indian reserva-
tion section of the statute.
Here, although the court was clearly aware of the existence of
Section 1151(c), and even emphasizes the statutory reference tc
allotted land in the course of its opinion, it once again selects froni
Toohgah Murrah's reasoning on the subject of why allotted land,
were not lands "within any Indian reservation" and, therefore, not
within federal jurisdiction under 23 Stat. 385.
The opinion, fortunately, is saved by the fact that the court
never actually finds that the crime for which Ellis was convicted
occurred on an Indian allotment. The court finds, instead, that:
The decisive issue is, what was the character of the lands at
the time of the commission of the crime. Was it such as to
confine jurisdiction on the United States7 If not, then this
petition for writ of habeas corpus must fail. The land in-
volved herein prior to March 3, 1891, was an Indian reserva-
tion owned and occupied by the Cheyenne and Arapaho In-
dians. On the aforesaid date the Congress of the United
States approved an agreement entered into by and between
the Cheyenne-Arapaho Indians and the Government of the
United States in October 1890. Therein the Cheyennes ceded
all their lands, without any reservation whatever, either ex-
press or implied, and all their claims, title and interest of
every kind and character to the Government of the United
States, subject to allotment, including the lands herein in-
volved. When Congress ratified the aforementioned agree-
ment of secession, it thereby dissolved the Cheyenne-
Arapaho reservation as such. Under the said treaty the In-
dians in said area were made subject to the laws both civil
and criminal, of the territory, and later of the State of
Oklahoma with the gift of citizenship and equal protection of
the laws. [Citations omitted.] Thus the Government of the
United States disestablished the Cheyenne-Arapaho Reserva-
tion and assimilated the said Indians as citizens of the State of
Oklahoma.'
The court continued, citing Tooisgah II as a case directly in
point and dispositive of the issue involved therein, even though no
194. Ellis v. State, 386 P.2d 326 (Okla. Cr. 1963).
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trust allotment question was pressed in Ellis. The court further
cited Application of Yates, and indicated its extensive reliance on
Tooisgah. The merits of this inquiry, a construction of Section
1151(c) as it related to the Indian country character of trust
allotments, were not addressed in either Yates or Ellis by other
than oblique dicta. Those cases are not authority for the jurisdic-
tional issue addressed herein.
Furthermore, the contention that the Ellis case decided by the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals is not authority for the
jurisdictional issue raised herein is conclusively supported by Ellis
v. Page,'95 wherein the same defendant filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the federal court, seeking his release from
custody on the same conviction complained of in the Oklahoma
case. The federal petition contained the same allegations as the
state petition and merely constituted a continuation of earlier
habeas corpus efforts by Ellis. He again relied on Seymour v.
Superintendent and Tooisgah v. United States. The court, in
defining the question presented in Ellis' appeal, announced:
The question is sharply drawn and simply put by the State as
whether at the time of the alleged offense the Cheyenne and
Arapaho reservation had been disestablished and was non-
existent. If not, exclusive jurisdiction was in the United
States, the State court lacked jurisdiction, and the writ
should issue.... "'
The court further stated:
There is no contention here that the offense was committed
on an Indian allotment "the Indian titles to which have not
been extinguished" within the meaning of § 1151(c).
We adhere to Tooisgah and hold that the situs of the of-
fense was not within the limits of an Indian reservation
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.'9
The emphatic indication by Chief Judge Murrah that no Section
1151(c) question was presented by the Ellis appeal creates a strong
inference that a different result would have been reached if a trust-
allotment-as-Indian-country question had been before the court.
Chief Judge Murrah, hearing the same case on appeal from the
federal district court where habeas corpus had been denied, clever-
ly makes certain the point is made that, "There is no contention
195. 351 F.2d 250 (10th Cir. 1965).
196. Id. at 251.
197. Id. at 252.
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here that the offense was committed on an Indian allotment the In-
dian titles to which have not been extinguished within the meaning
of § I .151(c)."' 5 For without such a contention having been ex-
plicitly dealt with by the Court of Criminal Appeals, one can pass
over the troubling emphasis supplied by the court to the words of
Section 1151(c), and the approving reference to Application of
Yates, apparently an Indian allotment case, and properly treat
Ellis v. State as a case construing not clause (c) but clause (a) of
Section 1151. It is interesting to note that while the dangerous
Tooisgah headnotes are appended to the opinion in Ellis v. State,
they are not attached to the studiously circumspect opinion of
Chief Judge Murrah in Ellis v. Page. Unfortunately, Murrah's
clever decision appears to have fallen on deaf ears. That the confu-
sion generated by the Tooisgah headnotes, in the Oklahoma
judiciary, continued beyond Ellis v. State, is clear from the case of
Williams v. State.'
Once again, a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals is bad-
ly saved from clear error. For, according to the court, the peti-
tioner simply alleged that the land upon which the crime for which
he was convicted was "Indian Land,"2 and not that it was an In-
dian allotment the Indian title to which had not been extinguished.
Still, the court does quote with approval from Ellis v. State,
quoting, in turn, from Exparte Wallace"':
Where Indian pleads guilty to information charging rape in
the first degree and no jurisdictional question is raised until
after more than three years have elapsed so as to bar prosecu-
tion in either state or federal court, the jurisdiction of the
state court cannot be challenged in collateral proceeding in
habeas corpus on ground that land on which offense was
committed was restricted Indian allotment and that the per-
son assaulted was a restricted Indian. °"
One cannot but be troubled by the fact that this quotation is
followed in the decision by an assertion that, "The Ellis case,
supra, amply covers all points regarding Indian land."2 3 For, what
was selected from the syllabus prepared by the court in Ellis as in-
dicative of this ample coverage is a slightly altered version of the
old headnotes from Tooisgah: "Deliberate choice of phrase within
198. Id.
199. 393 P.2d 887 (1964).
200. Id. at 888.
201. 162 P.2d 205 (1945).
202. Williams v. State, 393 P.2d 887, 889 (1964) (emphasis added).
203. Id.
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any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States
Government by Congress in determining the term "Indian coun-
try" indicated a congressional disposition to restrict federal
jurisdiction to organized reservations lying within a state.""2 ' This
dispostion being so clear: "The lands and Indians herein involved
not being within an Indian reservation... are therefore not within
the jurisdiction of the federal court but are within the jurisdiction
of the State of Oklahoma. '
In sum, until the decision in State v. Littlechie,2" there had been
no indication from the Court of Criminal Appeals that it recognized
the effect of the statutory change that took place in 1948. We can-
not yet be certain that it understands that while the deliberate
choice of the phrase, "within any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States Government" in 23 Stat. 385, as
opposed to the term "Indian country" employed in Revised
Statutes Sections 2145 and 2146 might well have "indicated a con-
gressional disposition to restrict federal jurisdiction to organized
reservations," the inclusion of the same phrase in Section 1151 of
Title 18, as one part of the tripartite definition of "Indian country"
contained therein, most certainly does not.
We cannot yet be sure that the Court of Criminal Appeals is en-
tirely cognizant of the fact that in Section 1151 Congress also
chose to extend its jurisdiction over "Indian country," beyond In-
dian reservations, to include as well all Indian allotments, "the In-
dian titles to which have not been extinguished," and to "all
dependent Indian communities ... whether within or without the
limits of a state." We cannot even know that Section 1153 refers
no longer to crimes committed "within any Indian reservation"
but instead, to crimes committed within "Indian country." The
law is clear. As the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California wrote in In re Carmen, a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding successfully challenging a state attempt to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over an Indian who assaulted another Indian
on Indian allotted land:
The Ten Major Crimes Act as originally enacted on March 3,
1885, 23 Stat. 385, was not applicable to the Indian country
generally but only to Indian reservations. But, when the Act
was incorporated into the New Criminal Code in 1948, the
reach of the Act was extended to all Indian country as de-
fined in Section 1151 of the code. Section 1151 represented
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. 573 P.2d 263 (Okla. Cr. 1978).
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the first attempt to statutorily define the term "Indian coun-
try" since the Act of June 30, 1834, 4 Stat. 729, which had
been repealed in 1874 (Revised Statutes § 5596). Section 1151
resulted from the judicial definitions of the term in the in-
tervening years. House Report No. 304, 80th Congress, page
4:92 states that Indian allotments were included in the defini-
tion of Indian Country on the authority of United States v.
Pelican. In Pelican a murder had been committed on an In-
dian allotment which had been carved out of an Indian reser-
vation and then excluded from the boundaries of the reserva-
tion. The Supreme Court held that so long as the United
States held title to the allotment in trust for the Indian allot-
tee it remained Indian country even though the allotment was
no longer within the reservation. 7 [Citation omitted. ]
The progeny of Tooisgah -Application of Yates and Ellis v.
State--are not the only Oklahoma cases that have addressed the
question of federal versus state jurisdiction over tribal Indians in
Oklahoma. For instance, not all Indian allotments were made pur-
suant to the General Allotment Act of 1887, an important legal
distinction underscored in the following case. The issue of
criminal jurisdiction over Indian allotments was ruled on by the
Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma in 19366 in Ex parte
Nowabbi. At issue in Nowabbi was proper situs of criminal
jurisdiction over the offense of murder committed by one Indian
against another upon a restricted allotment in that part of
Oklahoma that had formerly been Indian Territory. In an exten-
sive opinion, the court held, inter alia, that decisions of the United
States Supreme Court regarding jurisdiction to try an Indian for
the murder of another Indian on a restricted allotment are con-
clusive on state courts; that land which was formerly a part of an
Indian reservation established by the United States in a part of
Oklahoma that was formerly Oklahoma Territory, which is in
possession of Indians under restricted allotment without power of
alienation, is "Indian country" within the statute extending
general federal criminal laws to Indian country; and that Congress
has not reserved to the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to
punish Indians in the Indian Territory for the crimes enumerated
in Act of March 3, 1885, even when committed upon a restricted
Indian allotment.
The Nowabbi court drew the distinction between Indian
allotments made pursuant to the General Allotment Act of 1887,
207. In re Carmen, 165 F. Supp. 942, 945, a£f'd 270 F.2d 809 (1958).
208. 60 Okla. Cr. 111, 61 P.2d 1139 (1936).
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with its proviso reserving exclusive jurisdiction in the federal
courts until issuance of a patent in fee, and other special allotment
acts relating principally to the Five Civilized Tribes.
In discussing Section 349 of Title 25 of the United States Code,
and its provisos relating to the present jurisdictional question, the
court, speaking through Judge Doyle, stated:
It may be said that under this provision of said act all Indian
allottees and their allotments in that part of the State of
Oklahoma that was formerly Oklahoma Territory, are lands
in the Indian Country within the meaning of the section 2145,
Rev. Stat., and subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States, until the issuance of fee-simple patents. And
the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States over the
crimes named in Act of March 3, 1885, to wit, murder,
manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson,
burglary, and larceny when committed on Indian Reserva-
tions within the boundaries of a state on trust or restricted
allotments therein, by whomsoever committed, without
distinction as to race or color, is we think no longer open to
discussion. It has passed beyond the state of controversy. 2°
The trust allotments here considered are Indian allotments in
that part of Oklahoma that was formerly Oklahoma Territory.
For reasons set forth elsewhere regarding the Tooisgah decision,
Ex parte Nowabbi represents the law both before and after the
aberration presented in Tooisgah. The codification of the rule
enunciated in United States v. Pelican, United States v. Ramsey,
and Ex parte Van Moore in Section 1151(c) strengthens the
reasoning set forth in Nowabbi. DeCoteau v. District County
Court,"' like Tooisgah, is a disestablishment case construing the
Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Lake Traverse Reservation in South
Dakota under strikingly similar circumstances to the cession
agreement and allotment process that took place in Oklahoma
with respect to the Kiowa, Comanche and Apache Reservation.
In DeCoteau, the United States Supreme Court held that the
1891 Allotment Agreement containing a cession of all the tribe's
unallotted lands and opening the reservation to settlement ter-
minated the Lake Traverse Reservation. However, the Supreme
Court held that the land parcels within the former Lake Traverse
Reservation which are Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which
have not been extinguished, remain Indian country within the
209. Id. at 1154.
210. 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
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meaning of Section 1151(c) of Title 18, subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States and the tribe over matters not
covered by federal law. This fact situation so closely parallels the
historical situation with respect to the allotment agreement and
cession of tribal lands in western Oklahoma under the General
Allotment Act of 1887 and the agreements negotiated with the
tribes that DeCoteau must be recognized as conclusive authority
for the proposition that all trust and restricted allotments within
the boundaries of the former Territory of Oklahoma are Indian
country within the meaning of Section 1151(c). The Court stated:
The 1867 boundaries of the Lake Traverse Reservation
enclose approximately 918,000 acres of land. Within the 1867
boundaries, there reside about 3,000 tribal members and
30,000 non-Indians. About 15% of the land is in the form
of"Indian trust allotments"; these are individual land tracts
retained by members of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Tribe when
the rest of the reservation lands were sold to the United States
in 1891. The trust allotments are scattered in a random pat-
tern throughout the 1867 reservation area. The remainder of
the reservation land was purchased from the United States by
non-Indian settlers after 1891, and is presently inhabited by
non-Indians. It is common ground here that Indian conduct
occurring on the trust allotments is beyond the State's
jurisdiction, being instead the proper concern of tribal or
federal authorities. In the two cases before us, however, the
State asserted jurisdiction over Indians unallotted land
within the 1867 Reservation borders.2"
The Court stated further that:
It is true that the Sisseton-Wahpeton Agreement was unique
in providing for cession of all, rather than simply a major
portion of, the affected tribe's unallotted lands. But, as the
historical circumstances make clear, this was not because the
tribe wished to retain its former reservation, undiminished,
but rather because the tribe and the government were
satisfied that retention of allotments would provide an ade-
cuate fulcrum for tribal affairs. In such a situation, exclusive
tribal and federal jurisdiction is limited to the retained
allotments.
With the benefit of hindsight, it may be argued that the
tribe and the government would have been better advised to
211. ExparteVan Moore, 221 F. 954 (D.S.D. 1915).
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have carved out a diminished reservation, instead of or in ad-
dition to the retained allotments, But we cannot rewrite the
1889 Agreement and the 1891 statute. For the courts to
reinstate the entire reservation, on the theory that retention
of mere allotments was ill-advised, would carry us well
beyond the rule by which legal ambiguities are resolved to
the benefit of the Indians. We give this rule the broadest
possible scope, but it remains at base a canon for construing
the complex treaties, statutes, and contracts which define the
status of Indian tribes. A canon of construction is not a
license to disregard clear expressions of tribal and congres-
sional intent."2
In United States ex rel. Cook v. Parkinson,"3 the question of the
situs of criminal jurisdiction over the trust allotments within Ben-
nett County, South Dakota, and the disestablished and ceded por-
tion of the Pine Ridge Sioux Reservation was held to be within ex-
clusive federal and tribal jurisdiction in accordance with the In-
dian country definition of Section 1151(c). The court, specifically
following DeCoteau, stated:
In the judgment of this court, the only exclusive federal and
tribal jurisdiction remaining in Bennett County is over the
allotments retained within this ceded area under 18 USC §
1151(c). Because the effect of the act construed in DeCoteau
was to extinguish tribal jurisdiction over all former reserva-
tion lands except for retained allotments, the DeCoteau
Court felt that the tribe "would have been better advised to
have carved out a diminished reservation, instead of or in ad-
dition to the retained allotments." Id. In the Act of 1910
under consideration here the Oglala Sioux Tribe did just that.
The tribe retained a diminished reservation in the sense that
the term is used by the DeCoteau Court. 18 USC § 1151(a)
applies only to the remaining decreased reservation area
because the 1889 boundaries of the Pine Ridge Reservation
were changed to exclude the land described in the Act of May
27, 1910, 36 Stat. 440, the moment the presidential proclama-
tion was signed.
In the judgment of this Court, the agreement entered into
between the tribe and the government and embodied in the
Act of 1910, terminated exclusive tribal and federal jurisdic-
tion over the unallotted lands within Bennett County and
212. Id. at 315.
213. 396 F. Supp. 473 (1975).
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restored these lands to the public domain and to the jurisdic-
tion of South Dakota. It is also the judgment of this Court
that under 18 USC § 1151(a), tribal and federal jurisdiction
remains over the land within the diminished reservation
boundaries which consist of the area within the 1889 boun-
daries minus all of the land allotted and unallotted within
!Bennett County."'
In view of the above, there can be no dispute that Section
1151(c) Indian country exists in western Oklahoma.
INDIAN COUNTRY IN WESTERN OKLAHOMA*
Acres Acres
Tribe 1151(b) 1151(c)
Iowa of Oklahoma 12 1,509
Kansas or Kaw 20 0





Cheyenne, Arapaho 9,873 97,000
Citizen Band
of Potawatomi 261.25 4,270.7






Sac and Fox 805 18,406
TOTAL ALL TRIBES 21,884.63 519,319.3
*The omission of any reference to § 1151 (a) land is not a determination that such Indian
country does not exist. Rather, no opinion can be expressed until the Cheyenne-Arapho
case. No. CIV-75-0769, (W.D. Okla.), now on appeal, is decided. Therefore, all references
to § 115 (a) land have been omitted from this chart.
Recent Developments
The Cheyenne-Arapaho challenge to the right of the state of
Oklahoma to regulate hunting and fishing by tribal members
within the original 1869 reservation boundaries pending in the
federal courts, the recent findings by the Division of Indian Affairs
in the Department of Interior Solicitor's Office that the Absentee
Shawnee and Cheyenne-Arapaho tribes have the power to enact
and enforce tribal laws within Indian country, and the federal and
state Littlechief decisions concerning jurisdiction over trust
214. rd. at 494-95.
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allotments in western Oklahoma, represent substantial changes in
posture-not law-concerning tribal jurisdiction in western
Oklahoma.
The Cheyenne-Arapaho case represents affirmative and respon-
sible tribal initiative to resolve the reservation boundary issues.
The decision by the Solicitor's Office represents a shift in policy
rather than law-the law has been the same since 1890. And, the
Littlechief decision represents an emerging judicial posture where
interpretation of law is paramount, rather than where blind
adherence to misplaced slogans about "Oklahoma Indians"
prevails. The following is a concise review of these events.
First, in Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes v. State,21" the Cheyenne-
Arapaho tribes are seeking a declaratory judgment that tribes
have the exclusive right to regulate hunting and fishing within the
original reservation boundaries and its members have the right to
hunt and fish within the original boundaries of the 1869 Executive
Order making the Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation free from state
law. The tribes further seek a permanent injunction enjoining the
state of Oklahoma from enforcing its fish and game laws against
tribal members within the original boundaries of the reservation.
This case is the first case brought by one of the tribes in western
Oklahoma whose reservation has been judicially interpreted as
disestablished under pre-1962 standards. Judicial guideposts for
resolving the boundary issues in western Oklahoma will be
established in the Cheyenne-Arapaho case. The fundamental issue
in this case is one of determining where the tribal powers may be
exercised. The District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma has ruled adversely to the Cheyenne-Arapaho claim,
and the case is now on appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.
Second, recent findings by the Indian Division of the Solicitor's
Office involve the efforts of the Absentee Shawnee Tribe and the
Cheyenne-Arapaho tribes to be certified as eligible for funding
from the Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Ad-
ministration (LEAA). LEAA requires, as a condition precedent to
funding, certification from the Department of the Interior that an
applicant tribe has presently exercizable tribal law and order
powers.
Because the question of whether the boundaries of Indian reser-
vations in western Oklahoma have been disestablished by the
various allotment agreements is complex and will, in most cases,
215. No. CIV-75-0769-D (W.D. Okla. 1978), on app.
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require litigation to finally settle the issue, the Absentee Shawnee
Tribe, for the purposes of administrative determination for
eligibility for LEAA funds, focused on the tribal jurisdictional
issue rather than on the existence of reservation boundaries.
The question of whether fundamental tribal powers of self-
government survive the allotment process and the extinguishment
of reservation status has been authoritatively answered by the
United States Supreme Court in DeCoteau v. District County
Court,"6 holding that although the Sisseton-Wahpeton Reserva-
tion in South Dakota was disestablished and the boundaries ex-
tinguished, the civil and criminal jurisdictional powers of the
Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe expressly remained intact over
trust allotments within the original reservation boundaries under
Section 1151(c).
Accordingly, the tribe advanced the position to the Solicitor's
Office that the tribal powers of self-government, including law
and order powers, exist independent of the existence or nonex-
istence of reservation boundaries. The tribe reasoned that the
reservation boundary question goes only to the territorial limits of
tribal jurisdiction and not to the existence or nonexistence of the
tribal law and order powers.
The DeCoteau decision regarding tribal jurisdictional powers
over individually owned trust allotments within the original boun-
daries of a disestablished Indian reservation has been followed in
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kniep," and also in United States ex rel.
Cook v. Parkinson,"8 a case holding that trust allotments outside
the present boundaries of the Pine Ridge Sioux Reservation, but
within the original boundaries of the Pine Ridge Sioux Reservation
are subject to the jurisdictional powers of the Pine Ridge Sioux
Tribe.
In response to the tribe's request, the Acting Associate Solicitor,
Division of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior"" stated that
the Solicitor's Office had reviewed the acts of Congress relating to
the Absentee Shawnee Tribe to determine, first, whether tribal
powers had been specifically terminated and, second, the territory
within which such powers might be exercised.
After finding that no act of Congress expressly terminated or
diminished the tribal governmental powers of the Absentee
Shawnee Tribe, the second question was answered in the follow-
ing manner:
216. 120 U.S. 425 (1975).
217. 430 U.S. 584(1977).
218. 396 F. Supp. 473 (1975).
219. Opinion Letter of Nov. 16, 1977, to F. Browning Pipestem, Tribal Attorney.
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The second question, as you are aware, has been addressed
(although not directly in the context with which we are here
concerned), in Tooisgah v. United States. [Citation omitted.]
That decision has been considered an obstacle to exercise of
tribal authority since it held that an allotment under the
statutory definition of Indian country then existing was not a
reservation. That decision, however, should be extended no
further than it applies- to a statutory scheme which has since
been changed. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court
in DeCoteau v. District County Court, [citation omitted] has
defined the jurisdictional status of the circumstances involv-
ing the Absentee Shawnee Tribe- those allotments which re-
main are Indian Country for tribal jurisdictional purposes.
And, the overall findings were summarized as follows:
On the basis of rationale above briefly described, we have
concluded that the Absentee Shawnee Tribe possesses power
to enact and enforce its laws on restricted lands still held for
members of the tribe. Accordingly, we shall advise the Assis-
tant Secretary that no legal impediment exists to exercise of
law enforcement jurisdiction by the Absentee Shawnee and
also that we recommend that he so certify the Tribe for
LEAA purposes.22
The Cheyenne-Arapaho request was also answered affirmative-
ly by the Division of Indian Affairs. On the Indian country aspect,
the opinion stated:
The definition of Indian country includes "all Indian
allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been ex-
tinguished, including rights-of-way running through the
same." Indian allotments in the former Oklahoma Territory,
whether trust allotments or restricted allotments, are includ-
ed within this definition. [Citation omitted.] Allotments held
by members of the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma
are Indian country over which the tribes and the United
States have jurisdiction."'
On the LEAA certification, the Solicitor's Office recommended:
We recommend, therefore, that the Cheyenne-Arapaho
Tribes be certified as exercising law enforcement functions
for purposes of LEAA eligibility.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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Denial of BIA law enforcement or judicial services funding
to the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma may not be
based on the alleged absence of federal or tribal jurisdiction
over trust or restricted allotments.
222
Third, the Littlechief decisions, United States v. Littlechief,"2
and State v. Littlechief,2" ' holding that an Indian trust allotment
carved out of the Kiowa, Comanche and Apache Reservation is
Indian country within the meaning of Section 1151(c), put
Tooisgah and its judicial progeny in their proper perspective on
the jurisdiction over trust allotments question by specifically
declaring any reliance on Ellis v. State,2" to be misplaced. The
federal decision, which is incorporated by reference in the state
decision, quotes from DeCoteau, announcing: "It is common
ground here that Indian conduct occurring on the trust allotments
is beyond the State's jurisdiction, being instead the proper concern
of tribal or federal authorities." '226 The court further found that
Oklahoma had not amended its constitution to remove im-
pediments to exercising jurisdiction over Indian country and, fur-
ther, that Oklahoma had not acted pursuant to the "governing
acts of Congress"- Public Law 83-280 and the 1968 amendment
thereto found in the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968-to assume
jurisdiction over Indian country in Oklahoma. On this subject,
the court, speaking through the Honorable Fred Daugherty,
stated:
Under the provisions of Public Law 83-280 it appears
therefore that the State of Oklahoma could have unilaterally
assumed jurisdiction over any "Indian country" within its
borders at any time between 1953 and 1968 had the
Oklahoma Constitution been amended as required. After the
enactment of Title IV in 1968 Oklahoma had to amend its
constitution and the affected tribes had to consent to the
State's assumption of jurisdiction over them before the State
could acquire jurisdiction over "Indian country". See
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission; Kennerly v.
District Court. [Citations omitted.] However, the State of
Oklahoma apparently has never acted pursuant to Public
Law 83-280 or Title IV and assumed jurisdiction over the "In-
dian country" within it borders. See Confederated Bands and
222. Id.
223. CR-76-207-D (W.D. Okla. 1977).
224. 573 P.2d 263 (W.D. Okla. 1978).
225. 386 P.2d 326 (Okla. Cr. 1963).
226. DeCoteau v. District County Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 428 (1975).
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Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Washington. [Cita-
tion omitted. ]227
In the decision by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals,
the court affirmed the decision of the Caddo County Court finding
that the state of Oklahoma was without jurisdiction to prosecute
an Indian for a crime committed upon another Indian in Indian
country.
By the Littlechief decisions, the judicial posture of the federal
and state courts in Oklahoma moved from the aberrant adherence
to what Tooisgah did not decide, to a consistency with the over-
whelming weight of authority.
Summary of Conclusions
The United States has consistently recognized the internal
sovereignty of the Indian tribes in western Oklahoma and has ex-
pressly limited that sovereignty only through the provisions of
Section 1153 of Title 18 and Sections 1302 and 1303 of Title 25 of
the United States Code.
The imposition of state law on an Indian tribe is a serious
qualification of its internal sovereignty and can be accomplished
only by express statutory grant. In the absence of such grant,
assumption by the state of jurisdiction over the Indian country
without tribal consent violates Section 1326 of Title 25 of the
United States Code.
The only express statutory grant allowing the state of
Oklahoma to exercise jurisdiction over Indians within the Indian
country in western Oklahoma is contained in the Organic Act
which extends state jurisdiction concurrently with that of the
tribes over intertribal crimes and civil causes of action.
Except for the possible qualification of tribal power found in the
Oklahoma Organic Act, the tribes of western Oklahoma retain all
powers of tribal self-government possessed by any other federally
recognized tribe.
Specifically, each tribe in western Oklahoma retains the in-
herent authority to determine their formal government, adopt law
and order codes, civil codes, undertake correctional functions,
undertake programs aimed at preventing adult and juvenile delin-
quency, undertake adult and juvenile rehabilitation programs,
establish tribal court systems, employ tribal police, and to pro-
mote the general welfare, health, and safety of the tribe.
The reservation boundary issues, i.e., Section 1151(a) jurisdic-
227. 573 P.2d 263 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (Daugherty, J.).
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tion, are presently before the courts and will be clarified in the
Cheyenne-Arapaho case. Each tribe occupies a unique position
with respect to asserting its Section 1151(a) jurisdictional status.
Each tribe retains jurisdiction over some Section 1151(b) Indian
country.
Each tribe retains jurisdiction over some Section 1151(c) Indian
country.
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